United States v. Google : A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Modern Antitrust Enforcement
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Authors
Bentley, Thomas
Issue Date
2024-11-01
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Abstract
In the digital era, technology giants have reshaped the global economy, but their unprecedented influence has raised critical concerns around monopolistic practices and market control. This paper explores the United States Department of Justice’s (DOJ) antitrust case against Google, framing it within the broader context of U.S. antitrust law, and examines the implications of the DOJ's strategies through a game-theoretical model. The analysis highlights how historical antitrust precedents, such as the Sherman Act and landmark cases like Standard Oil and AT&T, inform current regulatory approaches toward Big Tech. With Google’s substantial market share in search and digital advertising, the DOJ’s lawsuit seeks to prevent monopolistic practices that allegedly stifle competition and consumer choice. This study applies an extended game-theoretical model to simulate strategic interactions among the DOJ, Google, and the judicial system, identifying negotiation as a theoretically optimal path for both sides. Yet, contrary to model predictions, the DOJ’s decision to pursue litigation reflects political motivations, the need for durable legal precedent, and the intention to influence both national and international regulatory standards. Through this case, the DOJ aims to achieve a broad-based regulatory impact, setting boundaries for market dominance that may apply across the tech industry. The outcomes of this case bear significant implications for future antitrust enforcement, the operational strategies of tech companies, and judicial standards for addressing monopolistic behavior in digital markets. This analysis underscores the strategic complexities of regulating Big Tech and the evolving relationship between government authority and corporate power in the digital age.
Description
59 p.