The Kickback Problem: A Look at the Captive Prison Telecommunication Market
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Authors
DuWaldt, Matthew Thomas
Issue Date
2012
Type
Thesis
Language
en_US
Keywords
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Abstract
Within the last few decades, the American prison population has grown at an
unprecedented rate and is now a multi-billion dollar market. Telecommunication
companies have reaped great profits from this expansion of a captive prison market due
to their abundant state-granted monopolies throughout the United States. However, these
contracts often come with commissions, or the more appropriate label of ""kickbacks,"
that have played a key role in creating inequitable and exorbitant phone rates. These price
rates, unmatched anywhere else in the United States, arc defended as a necessary cost due
to additional security measures required with prison-originated calls. However, evidence
shows that these claims are outdated at best and deceptive at worst. Additionally, these
high rates fall squarely on the shoulders of struggling family members and underfunded
legal counsel that wish to contact an individual on prison. Large phone bills thus cut into
the already strapped pockets of those who can afford it least so that the state and the
contracted telecommunication firm are able to protect its already monopolistic-sized
profit margins. These practices continue in spite of the extensive literature demonstrating
the benefits of familial contact on recidivism.
This paper conducts a literature review detailing how this system came about and
what its current implications are in the United States. An economic eye will be turned to
the effects of kickbacks while also examining the broader context in which the current
prison telecommunication industry plays a role. Offering analysis using economic
concepts to demonstrate the inefficiencies and flaws currently found in the industry, I
ultimately lend my support for the current arguments set before the Federal
Communications Commission brought on by the Wright Petitioners by utilizing the
analysis found in the Dawson Affidavit and the Wood Study.
Description
iii, 67 p.
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License
U.S. copyright laws protect this material. Commercial use or distribution of this material is not permitted without prior written permission of the copyright holder.