Act and Rule Utilitarianism

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Authors
Schodowski, Justin
Issue Date
2021-06-01
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Thesis
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en_US
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Abstract
Utilitarianism is a doctrine of ethical theories that justifies the rightness of all actions on the outcome in which they produce. By accepting the foundation that Utilitarianism roots itself in, which states that rightness is the matter of goodness, we are left with pragmatic instability. This instability is caused by the irrational expectations that Act utilitarianism, along with similar forms, place on individuals. While historically flawed, its more developed counterpart, Rule Utilitarianism, aims to accomplish the overall goal of promoting the most good, while simultaneously appealing to practicality. The evaluation of Rule Utilitarianism, and the devaluation of Act Utilitarianism, can both be attributed to the feasibility of their application. Through practices of revisionary philosophy, I propose the superiority of an ethical doctrine should be derived from its capacity to function in reality, making Rule Utilitarianism a more reliable approach than its contemporaries. After a brief summarization of the history behind consequentialism as a whole, I intend to offer a rebuttal to Act Utilitarian Jonathan Riley. I reject his standards of strong anonymity and neutrality, as they are unobtainable degrees of calculus beyond the plausible capacity of human beings, and also disregard the inevitability of the human condition. Also, I address and refute the way in which act utilitarianism historically rejects the role of human communities in ethical evaluation. In return, I offer Rule Utilitarianisms remedial approach to account for reality.
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36 p.
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