An Enquiry into Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal Positivism
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Authors
Dulmage, Philip Longfellow
Issue Date
1964
Type
Thesis
Language
en_US
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
My interest 1s the study of law. It is the sole goal
upon which I wish to focus and direct my energies. But
what is law? I have no notion of the subject toward which
my energies are cast. My enquiry starts out with a blank
slate, a condition in which my yearning for objectivity rejoices. Blank slates are, however, dangerous Though what is written upon them be in chalk and can be erased,
the vague imprint remains to blur perhaps a final and
truer impression. It is necessary, therefore, to determine
the standards upon which I embark upon the beginning of
this enqu1ry. These standards cannot be derived from law
itself, but can only be those which I have formed prior to
this enquiry. These can be only two: ethical and analytical.
The first standard is simply a dissatisfaction with
absolutes and leaps, the reasoned absolutes and the irrational
leaps. Dissatisfaction is endless. For this endless
quest I need freedom. Freedom is what? Is it an
absolute? No. Freedom is not an absolute but a flexible
limit to thought and action. I am free to think about
everything, but only a goal, or limit will give that thought
d1rection, hence meaning. The limit is arbitrarily imposed by the needs of the moment, it is the space between two
points on a infinite line. My standards for thought are
what is useful and what will achieve my immediate goal.
I won't find out what freedom is by merely placing dots on
a line, but by exercising and stretching the limits of
thought.
Description
viii, 102 p.
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License
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