Concepts in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
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The phenomenological method is so intricate that it could not conceivably be presented completely in less than several hundred pages. However, it is possible to introduce some of the concepts so that the reader may gain a fairly clear idea of how the method of phenomenology differs from the common empirical way of looking at the world. In choosing essence, transcendent and immanent perception, intention, and intuition, I hope to gradually lead the reader to a realization of just what types of results the phenomenological method is likely to produce. There are two outstanding difficulties, unfortunately, in such a short presentation. The first is that it was found to be impractical to describe these five concepts individually, without reference to each other. Thus, intention and intuition find their way into the early chapters before they have actually been examined. I offer no defensive explanations for this except that it simply seemed unfeasible to mark rigid boundaries between aspects of a theory that are basically intertwined. The second difficulty is that the phenomenological theory never comes to life. Without previous knowledge, it is extremely unlikely that the reader will be able to put the method to work. But I have not humored myself into thinking that such a thing would be possible here, so perhaps it is enough that interest may be instilled to pursue phenomenology further.