On Not Taking Moral Facts Seriously
Loading...
Authors
Snare, Francis E.
Issue Date
1965
Type
Thesis
Language
en_US
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show the circumstances
when it might be possible not to take moral facts
seriously. Furthermore we would like to investigate some
of the arguments against holding such a postition. More
specifically, we would like to do the following things in
this paper. First, we would like to consider whether it
is logically possible to hold such a position. But we can
only know this when we know a little more about what kind
of fact a particular moral fact is. Admittedly, if a
moral fact is of one kind, then the above dialogue is
logically improper. However if it is contended that the
moral fact is of a second kind, then we are prepared to
argue that there is nothing logically inconsistent about
refusing to take those facts as serious considerations.
Now I must admit that I strongly suspect that moral facts
are of the former sort and that under normal circumstances
there is something logically peculiar about refusing to
take seriously what we know to be the moral facts. However
since some philosophers have insisted in speaking
of moral facts in the second sense. we will argue that
in that sense, there is really nothing logically improper
about refusing to take moral facts seriously. The point
will be that, it we cannot convincingly disprove the contention
that there are moral facts of the second variety,
then we can without contradiction refuse to take those
facts as serious considerations.
Description
iv, 60 p.
Citation
Publisher
License
U.S. copyright laws protect this material. Commercial use or distribution of this material is not permitted without prior written permission of the copyright holder. All rights reserved.