On Not Taking Moral Facts Seriously
Snare, Francis E.
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The purpose of this paper is to show the circumstances when it might be possible not to take moral facts seriously. Furthermore we would like to investigate some of the arguments against holding such a postition. More specifically, we would like to do the following things in this paper. First, we would like to consider whether it is logically possible to hold such a position. But we can only know this when we know a little more about what kind of fact a particular moral fact is. Admittedly, if a moral fact is of one kind, then the above dialogue is logically improper. However if it is contended that the moral fact is of a second kind, then we are prepared to argue that there is nothing logically inconsistent about refusing to take those facts as serious considerations. Now I must admit that I strongly suspect that moral facts are of the former sort and that under normal circumstances there is something logically peculiar about refusing to take seriously what we know to be the moral facts. However since some philosophers have insisted in speaking of moral facts in the second sense. we will argue that in that sense, there is really nothing logically improper about refusing to take moral facts seriously. The point will be that, it we cannot convincingly disprove the contention that there are moral facts of the second variety, then we can without contradiction refuse to take those facts as serious considerations.