Game Theory as an Approach to Successful Terrorist Negotiation Policy
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Authors
Kowalski, Sean K.
Issue Date
1985
Type
Thesis
Language
en_US
Keywords
Alternative Title
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to provide an indepth understanding of the
negotiation process surrounding an episode in which a person or group
captures persons or property and demands some reciprocal action in exchange
for safe release. Its focus is on the triangular interaction
between first, the victim, who is being threatened by the hostage-takers
and is dependent on the state for protection, next the state or government,
that must provide the protection while answering the demands
issued by the final actor, the hostage-takers. The analytical method
utilized is primarily mathematical. Specifically, the concepts of game
theory, a relatively new approach to such problems, are used. The
result is a model that simulates the bargaining that takes place in
hostage situations. The paper's goal will then be satisfied when the
model is applied. If the model fails to yield any useful realistic
results, then its short-comings should indicate important elements in
hostage situations. On the other hand, if the model works as designed,
its results should make some descriptive, prescriptive, and predictive
conclusions possible. At any rate, the objective can be realized.
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Description
vii, 92 p.
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License
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