Critical Analysis of United States Foreign Policy Toward Lebanon From 1975-1985
Pelletier, Darryl R.
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In 1958, 1975, and 1982, the United States was drawn into the events of Lebanon where its population fought along ethno-sectarian lines. The crisis which boiled from 1976 to 1982 enlarged to include regional powers, and threatened to become an international crisis. In 1975, the Ford administration declined any intervention in the crisis but, in 1992, the Reagan administration accepted a chance to direct the Lebanese government in its call for assistance. This study seeks to understand the full extent of events in Lebanon from 1975-1985, in which U.S. administrations sought to gain U.S. interest. This study concludes that Ford and Reagan administration policy would have benefited from three developments: 1) the development of realistic goals that could have been accomplished; their strategies failed and efforts (exhausting diplomatic possibilities before turning to a military strategy) could have been undertaken to achieve the original or revised objectives; 2) a view of concerns and ramifications regarding domestic problems, not solely concerned with the international and regional levels (the Reagan administration was guilty of this not the Ford administration); and 3) the elimination of faulty analysis and judgments of opponents and policy effects.