

African Socialism and Attaining the Pan-African Ideal: Tanzania and Kenya,
1950-1970

By

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List of Principal Acronyms

AAPC	All-African Peoples' Conference
ACL	African Communities League
AFC	Agriculture Finance Corporation
ANC	African National Congress
APC	African People's Party
AU	African Union
EASCO	East African Common Services Organization
EU	European Union
ICDC	Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KADU	Kenya Africa Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KKM	Kiama kia Muingi
KNTC	Kenya National Trading Corporation
KPU	Kenya People Union
MAP	Millennium African Recovery Plan
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NHC	National Housing Corporation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PADA	Organization for Peace and Appropriate Development for the Horn of Africa
PAFMECA	Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Movement of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa
PRA	Parti du Regroupment Africaine
RDA	Rassemblement Democratique Africaine
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
TANU	Tanganyikan African National Union
UAS	Union of African States
UGTAN	Union Général des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire
UNIA	United Negro Improvement Association
USA	United States of Africa

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I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in their efforts solve the problems of this continent. I dream of our vast deserts, of our forests, of all our great wildernesses.

To George Odhiambo Oloo and Cornelia "Kee" Klaaren. May the two of you rest in
peace.

Introduction

My Pan-African interest stems from my experience studying in Nairobi, Kenya between September 2000 and September 2001. In Nairobi, my intellectual curiosity was stimulated while taking a comparative African politics course at the University of Nairobi with Dr. Peter Wanyande, where I was introduced to Pan-Africanism in an African political context. Combining my classroom knowledge with my immersion in Kenya, I questioned what would have happened if Pan-Africanism, as envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, was realized beyond the formation of the Organization of African Unity which emerged in 1963 and is now, as of 2001, the African Union (AU). Would the unfettered corruption that is commonplace in states like Kenya and Nigeria prevail today if there was total African integration—economic and political? Would the West still exploit African resources while African families live in utter poverty and famine? I had infinite questions, but not a single answer, because Pan-Africanism—total African political, economic, and social unity—has not been realized.

After leaving Kenya in March 2001 to complete my Spring Trimester at Kalamazoo College, I returned to Nairobi to conduct research for this analysis. The central question that I am addressing is this: Why was Pan-Africanism unable to be realized beyond the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was a compromise organization formed in 1963? More specifically, I am focusing on one of the three main streams of Pan-Africanism—African Socialism—and examining it as an ideology in an East African context. The three main streams, or tenets, apparent in Pan-African thought are Black Nationalism, African unity, and socialism. African Socialism,

an African brand of socialism and extremely vague ideology, was inherently considered to be part and parcel of continental Pan-Africanism because it was developed by African leaders, and was thus uniquely African. It aimed to save Africans from the Western capitalist system they encountered during slavery and subsequently imperialism, which manifested itself in colonialism. As a theory, African Socialism sought to restore the human dignity in Africans so that they realized the importance of the needs of the community and others before individual needs, which proponents claimed characterized African society prior to the advent of Europeans. Through reversion to African Socialism, a Pan-African ethic could be restored, and a unified Africa attained.

Yet ideology was challenged with pragmatic concerns. The chapters of this analysis will address these concerns by first providing an overall review of Pan-Africanism in the African Diaspora and the African continent so that the phenomenon is understood, and show how diametrically opposing ideologies and practices among leaders, and the factionalization of the movement, accounted for its failure. Primarily, the focus of this examination is on Kenya and Tanzania, where the Post-Colonial regimes under Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania were committed to the implementation of African Socialism, but were challenged with economic and political realities. The uniqueness of this examination is that East Africa is the focal point, while most Pan-African scholarship addresses West Africa and leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Touré of Guinea as they are generally known as the spearheads of the movement. Yet Nyerere was committed to attaining what he considered to be the Pan-African ideal, a return to traditional life and a commitment to developing Tanzania's brand of African Socialism—Ujamaa. Ujamaa, a Kiswahili word,

literally means 'family-hood,' which underscores how important the family and community were compared to the individual in Nyerere's vision of socialism. In Kenya, African Socialist principles were articulated in policy documents, but not beyond them because the Kenyatta Administration sacrificed such principles in the name of economic growth and development.

My research methodology was primarily archival. I analyzed primary sources that I collected from the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi, the Africana Library at the University of Nairobi, and the Government Press of Kenya. I also interviewed several individuals at the University of Nairobi to help to contextualize the material I gathered, and to appreciate just how emotive Pan-Africanism is. I combined these findings with several secondary sources, mainly books and journal articles that discuss African Socialism as a means to realize Pan-Africanism.

As state-level African Socialism was considered to be the prerequisite for total integration, states had to be committed to its implementation. It was necessary for individuals within states to think beyond their individual needs on behalf of the welfare of Africa collectively for states to be committed to losing some of their state sovereignty and territorial boundaries constructed during European colonialism. This incremental process was advocated by Nyerere of Tanzania, but challenged by Nkrumah and others. The next chapters will address origins of Pan-Africanism and the tension and challenges the movement faced in the Diaspora, and in implementing African Socialism in Africa, and finally discuss the modern implications of Pan-Africanism.

Chapter 1

The Birth of a Movement

Developing a definitive and all-encompassing definition of Pan-Africanism is a convoluted task. Various explanations and interpretations have been proposed that differ immensely. Pan-Africanism generically embodies all efforts, political, social, cultural, economic, and emotional, aimed at the attainment of African and Diasporan unity, pride, advancement, justice and freedom. 'Pan' means 'all,' so Pan-Africanism includes all people of African ancestry throughout the world, and recognizes that they are all linked to Africa through the common experiences of slavery, oppression, and exploitation. Furthermore, they must rediscover and recover their identity in order to fight for liberation from neo-colonialism and racism. This chapter will discuss the origins of Pan-African ideas and their eventual materialization into a largely African Diasporan movement. Prior to becoming an African continental movement that fundamentally prescribed African Socialism as the means for future continental unity, Pan-Africanism as a movement and ideology was the product of thinkers outside of continental Africa.

Pan-African Origins

In the 1930's W.E.B. Du Bois, who is often referred to as the father of Pan-Africanism, asserted:

The Pan-African Movement aims at an intellectual understanding and co-operation among all groups of African descent in order to bring about the industrial and spiritual emancipation of the Negro people (Legum 1962, 14).

Du Bois's interpretation was met with conflicting opinions, indicating the inadequacy and futility of seeking to formulate a precise and all-inclusive definition of Pan-Africanism. As British Journalist Colin Legum stated, Pan-Africanism

is essentially a movement of ideas and emotions; at times it achieves a synthesis; at times it remains at the level of thesis and antithesis. In one sense it can be linked to socialism; in another sense it can be linked to World Federation, Atlantic Union or Federal Europe; each allows for great scope of interpretation in its practical application. And yet, Pan Africanism is different from all these movements in that it is exclusive (Legum 1962, 14).

This interpretation of Pan-Africanism is workable because it accounts for the fact that Pan-Africanism is not a static term, nor is it as a definition or movement always in a state of synthesis or cohesion. On the contrary, it normally is in a state of tension as it is opportunistically molded to fit various perceptions. According to historian P. Olanwuche Esedebe, it is important to list the major component ideas of the phenomenon to discern Pan-Africanism. These ideas include, principally, Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African origin, solidarity among peoples of African descent, belief in a distinct African personality, rehabilitation of Africa's past, pride in African culture, Africa for Africans in church and state, and the hope for a united and glorious future for Africa. These components, as Esedebe notes, 'pervade in the resolutions of Pan-African meetings held outside and inside the continent since 1900; they permeate the utterances of men like W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, and Julius Nyerere. Pan-Africanism glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values' (Esedebe 1982, 3).

Pan-Africanism emerged in reaction to the social condition that, irrespective of their founding contributions as slaves or colonial forced laborers, Africans and their descendants throughout the world existed as victims who unwillingly were forced into a life of servitude and exploitation. It originated as a movement of ideas and emotions that were a psychological response to these inhuman cultural and social conditions. As an idea, Pan-Africanism can be traced back to slavery and the slave trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the movement was not yet identified, individuals sought the restoration of the dignity of Africans and their descendants. According to Ali Mazrui:

Africans in the Diaspora found unity in Pan-Africanism on the basis of their having been jointly enslaved; Africans in Africa, on the other hand, found the same unity in Pan-Africanism on the basis of their having been jointly colonized; the two groups found a unifying universalism in Pan-Africanism on the basis of then having been jointly exploited by the Western world (Nasong'o 2000, 4).

Another problem with defining Pan-Africanism is determining precisely what year the movement began, or by whom it was initiated. The phenomenon cannot be ascribed to any one individual, or its origins traced to a particular year, because deciding which features should be considered of importance is relative. One can argue that scholars should only focus on concrete aspects of Pan-Africanism, such as conferences and pressure groups, at the expense of sentiments and notions. This, however, disregards the fact that 'sentiments' and 'notions' constitute an integral part of ideology, and everything concrete begins as an idea. When nurtured, ideas transform and manifest themselves in concrete movements and the like. Therefore, it is imperative to pay due

attention to the formation of these ideas, especially focusing on the historical context within which they were bred.

Pan-Africanist thinking began in the Americas and represented a reaction against the oppression of Blacks and the racial doctrines of the eighteenth century. How was it that during the American Revolution from British rule, amidst claims that Americans possessed such a high degree of respect for individual liberty, that people held so many slaves and made such fine distinctions between humans? This 'freedom' in America was illusory and determined by skin color and gender. It did not extend to everyone, and Blacks experienced first-hand the hypocrisy of the American Revolution that was supposedly fought for the civil rights of all men, and the hypocrisy of the United States, which so eloquently enshrined egalitarian principles in documents such as the founding Constitution. In this same document, Article 2 (2) declared that Black male slaves were regarded as three fifths of a man, and this measure was taken not to recognize that they were, in fact, somewhat human, but rather to increase representation of southern states in the United States House of Representatives.

Article 1(9) abolished the slave trade but not slavery. This clause legitimized slavery because it did not address the institution of slavery, but only the formal end of the slave trade. This allowed the institution to flourish well beyond the end of the trade, meaning that there would be an abundance of cheap labor and no need for additional human capital. Article 4 (2) stated that those who escaped from one state to another had to return to the state from which they escaped, meaning that slaves were required to return to their slave states even if they escaped to free states, and slavery lived on.

Documents such as the Constitution defined the status of Blacks and generated a sense of racial superiority among Whites, and corresponding inferiority among Blacks.

Early Pan-African Thinkers

The list of individuals associated with the development of Pan-African ideology is seemingly endless. Olaudah Equiano, otherwise known as Gustavas Vasa the African, conveyed in his autobiography, *Equiano's Travels*, published in 1789, the fear he had about being re-enslaved, and the impunity with which the supposedly emancipated slaves were universally insulted and robbed 'for such is the equity of the West Indian laws, that no free Negro's evidence will be admitted in their courts of Justice' (Esedebe 1982, 18). Equiano was taken from his native home in Igboland, Nigeria around the age of ten and sold to a planter in the West Indies. He worked aboard ships, which operated between England and the Caribbean, until he managed to save enough money to buy his freedom in 1776. Once free, he felt the only way to secure his freedom was to flee. He made his way to England and helped organize the repatriation of some liberated slaves to Sierra Leone (Esedebe 1982,18).

Equiano contended that his Black brethren were not born naturally inferior to Whites, contributing little or nothing to the comfort of humanity. This went against the Aristotelian hypothesis that was used to justify slavery, which claimed that some humans were by nature slaves while others were free. Slaveholders and traders argued that since Native Americans and Africans were unable to resist Europeans, they were naturally inferior, which reinforced the theory. Equiano, in defense of his people, reminded

Europeans that in spite of their superiority complex, their ancestors were, like the Africans, uncivilized and barbarous. He was proud of his African origins and praised his ethnic group, the Igbos. He blamed Europeans for much of the inter-communal conflict among Africans, and by drawing attention to violence in eighteenth century Europe, showed that violence was not related only to Black men or Africa. He sought to prove that African backwardness was neither inherent nor permanent, but the result of adverse circumstances and lack of opportunity (Esedebe 1982, 21). Although he did not arrange any Pan-African conferences or meetings, his sentiments were part of the birth of Pan-African ideology as he helped to lay the foundation for the movement's emergence.

Edward Blyden was possibly the greatest exponent of Pan-African concepts. He has been described as the highest intellectual representative and the greatest defender of Africans throughout the world. He was born in the Danish West Indian Island of St. Thomas and was of Igbo descent, although other sources claim that he was the son of slaves from Togoland. Because of the poor financial circumstances of his parents, he was expected to go into tailoring. However, he was consumed with love for Africa and wanted to contribute to the continent's advancement, so he set off to the United States in search of an education that would enable him to work in Africa. Institutions, however, refused to admit him because of his race, so he shifted his attention to traveling to the Republic of Liberia, where he emigrated in January 1851 with the aid of the New York Colonization Society (Esedebe 1982, 31).

In response to Majola Agbebi, a Youruba Baptist in Nigeria who inaugurated what was very likely the first independent Native African Church in West Africa in 1902, Edward Blyden first applied the term 'African Personality' to Agbebi. Blyden explained

that Africa was struggling for a separate personality and feared that uncritical absorption of Western ideas would eventually destroy the distinctive personality of Africans.

Blyden stressed the importance and desirability of controlling the process of acculturation between the West and Africa. He contended:

The African must advance by methods of his own. He must possess a power distinct from that of the European. It has been proved that he knows how to take advantage of European culture and that he can be benefited by it. Their proof was perhaps necessary, but it is not sufficient. We must show that we are able to go alone, to carve out our own way (Legum 1962, 20).

This notion of Africans carving out their own way conveyed the need for Africans to lead themselves both ideologically and practically away from Western constructs that became ingrained in African society. They had to realize that, contrary to what Europeans contested, Africans did have a past that could serve to influence and encourage them to distinctly develop their gifts and abilities, and do this in their natural homeland—Africa. They could advance through reversion to some of the practices of African antiquity and refrain from using Western frameworks and models to assess their progress. Similarly, the Western World had to refrain from measuring Africa and its progress in terms of Western advancement and civilization.

Blyden generated an intellectual reaction to the imposition of European values. In order to prevent European forces from destroying African cultural heritage, he pressed for the establishment of a West African University and a West African church to be controlled by Africans. He proposed a curriculum that was largely based on African subjects including African language. To Blyden, Africans had to improve their capacities

and appreciate their hereditary qualities, which were 'capacities and qualities which the world needs, but which it will never enjoy until he is fairly and normally trained. In the music of the universe each shall give a different sound but necessary to the grand symphony' (Legum 1962, 20).

His founding ideals and concepts instilled hope in African Americans and Africans, many of whom believed it was necessary for Africans to follow the path paved by Europeans in order to advance. Africans were suffocating from the dogmas and doctrines espoused by the supposedly enlightened Europeans and Americans who found infinite value in their own construction of culture and history, but left no room for African conceptions. It is against this background that Henry Sylvester Williams sought to formalize and institutionalize the Pan-Africanist ideas of individuals like Blyden and Horton. This growing feeling of anti-colonial and anti-Western sentiment among Africans in the Diaspora is what accounted for the emergence of the African Association in England on 24 September 1887 through the efforts of Williams, a West Indian Barrister from Trinidad. Since Great Britain was the greatest colonial power and the center of imperial and missionary interests, it was the natural focus for a protest movement. The objectives of the organization were: to encourage a feeling of unity; to facilitate friendly intercourse among Africans in general; to promote and protect the interest of all subjects claiming African descent, wholly or in part, in British colonies and other places especially in Africa, by circulating accurate information on all subjects of the British empire, and by direct appeals to the imperial and local governments (Legum 1962, 24).

Williams was the first person to actually discuss Pan-Africanism, although in 1897 DuBois said that 'if the Negro were to be a factor in the world's history it would be through a Pan-Negro movement' (Legum 1962, 24). Williams practiced at the English Bar where he acted as legal advisor to African dignitaries on political missions to the colonial office during 1895-1900 when imperialism and colonialism had begun in earnest. As he was getting a first hand understanding of what the British were doing by virtue of his position, he decided to help combat these British policies and organized a small Pan-African conference in London between 23-27 July 1900, which was attended by thirty delegates from the US and West Indies. It provided a forum to protest against the aggression of White colonizers, and to appeal to the missionary and abolitionist tradition of the British, specifically to those who supported the Africans and their plight, to protect Africans from the depredations of Empire builders. The conference was also an opportunity for people of African descent throughout the world to come together and be in closer touch in order to establish friendlier relations with one another. Another aim of the conference was to start a movement that looked forward to securing for all Africans in all corners of the world their full rights as well as promoting their business interests (Nasong'o 2000, 18). A great achievement of this conference was the crystallization of the idea of oneness in the experience and ideals of Blacks. Unfortunately, however, Williams returned to Trinidad shortly after the conference, where he passed away.

W.E.B Du Bois, often referred to as the father of Pan-Africanism, is credited with conserving and nurturing Pan-African ideals until they found acceptance as the basic ideology on the African continent. Du Bois, a 19th century African American intellectual,

vigorously championed the Black claim for self-determination. As an academic, he set high scholarly standards by writing a series of studies of the social history of Black people, which was a field at that time characterized by ignorance, stereotypes, and outright racism. In his *Souls of Black Folks*, a collection of essays published in 1903, Du Bois gave a literary voice that was antagonistic to that of Booker T. Washington, who was the undisputed Black leader of the time. Du Bois, who began his academic journey at Fisk University, and then went to Harvard where he obtained his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees, opposed what he thought was the conservative acceptance of subordinate roles articulated by Booker T. Washington. He challenged Washington's doctrine of tame submission and accused it of being an apology for injustice as it did not value the right and duty of voting, it downplayed the emasculating effects of caste distinctions, and was, therefore, a hindrance to the higher training and ambition of bright minds among Blacks (Nasong'o 2000, 7).

Washington was born into slavery in 1859, a son of a White slave owning father and a Black slave mother. A graduate of Hampton University, where he pursued industrial training, he founded The Tuskegee Institute in Alabama that was modeled along the same lines as his former school. The controversy between Du Bois and Washington frequently is thought to only be a dispute as to whether Blacks should have an industrial or classical education, but this is a far too simplistic and superficial way of looking at it. This argument was carried out without paying due attention to what America at large was doing at this time in terms of industrial technology. The country had entered a new period as slavery had been abolished and new immigrants were entering in great numbers in search of work. The economy had taken on a new form, and

aimed at the mechanization of agriculture, grain preservation, canning, and allied industries. People were stressing the need for a free flow of goods and commodities, and in the midst of all this, Washington feared that the abolition of slavery had left millions of Blacks anxious to enter the free market, yet lacking the necessary skills to meet the demands. Furthermore, the swarm of immigrants entering the country and the availability of foreign labor was disastrous for Blacks. Washington conceived, therefore, a proposal to develop a form of industrial education that might prepare Blacks, who were at a disadvantage, to enter American life (Makonnen 1973, 53).

Ras Makonnen, the author of *Pan-Africanism From Within*, argues that we have to get away from the false dichotomy between industrial and classical education to understand what Du Bois and Washington were arguing about. Makonnen held that the very kind of education that Du Bois was fighting for for Blacks in America had been a failure in India, and that the controversy between Du Bois and Washington was personal. It was a cultural and mental conflict as Du Bois felt an intellectual contempt for Washington—the contempt of the Harvard and Berlin trained scholar for the mere product of a Negro Industrial school like Hampton (Makonnen 1973, 54). This makes one wonder if Du Bois, who fervently argued that Blacks needed to control their own destinies and pave their own paths, was hypocritical for assuming that by virtue of his Harvard and Western European education, this placed him on a level above Washington who enjoyed an education from a historically Black school. Additionally, it is important to put into historical context the fact that Washington's upbringing was in the American south where he was born into slavery while Du Bois was raised on the East Coast, where racism and discrimination were also thriving, yet not comparable to what Washington

experienced. Blacks in the south lived in constant fear of operations of groups like the Ku Klux Klan since the Civil War had just come to an end and White hatred and bitterness were rampant.

Du Bois was against what he regarded as Washington's tactic of accommodation, and demanded full social and political equality for Blacks, not as ultimate goals to be achieved in some distant remote future, but as practical and attainable ones at that time. Washington, who believed in racial separation so long as Blacks could support themselves financially, publicly enunciated his race philosophy in 1895 at the Atlanta Exposition where he was formally invited by White power barons to speak on behalf of Blacks, and where he, as Du Bois put it, sought 'to gain the sympathy and cooperation of the various elements comprising the white south' (Du Bois 1969, 80). He launched the famous Atlanta Compromise at the Atlanta Exposition where he stated, 'in all things purely social we can be as separate as the five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.' To Du Bois, surrendering political power for the sake of economic power would prove detrimental to Blacks, who desperately needed to assert themselves politically. The fact that Washington asked Black people to give up, first, political power; second, insistence on civil rights; and third, higher education of Negro youth indicated to Whites that Blacks were willing to be appeased and live in ignorance so long as they were able to put food on the table. His program accepted the alleged inferiority of Blacks and aimed to have students concentrate all their energies on industrial education, accumulation of wealth, and the conciliation of the south as opposed to political power and the right to vote, insistence on civil rights, and the higher education of the Negro youth (Du Bois 1969, 87).

The debate generated by the divergent views of Du Bois and Washington escalated and helped to articulate the key differences between a militant, radical integrationist tactic and an accommodationist-separatist one. In 1905, Du Bois helped to form the Niagara Movement from which the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) later emerged, and became the major figure in the tactical split in Black politics. While Du Bois epitomized this militant and radical approach which later manifested itself on the African continent where there were also divergent views as to how to achieve continental unity, Washington was on the other side with the accommodationists willing, at least for a temporary period, to tolerate segregation in return for the short-term gains that would accrue from a more gradualist approach (Nasong'o 2000, 6). Du Bois thought that the damage done to the Black psyche and the internalization of inferiority that came with accommodation was detrimental and much more expensive than rightly fighting for social and political justice. This acceptance would lead to permanent second-class position for Blacks.

To many, Du Bois' ideas and writings were full of complexities and contradictions as he was a militant protesting integrationist who demanded full and equal rights between Blacks and Whites; a nationalist whose conception of race appealed for self-determination and self actualization as necessary conditions for the realization of Blacks' innate uniqueness and powers; a strategist and tactician of protest and an internationalist who organized and articulated the outcry of oppressed colonial people all over the world; a moralizer with sometimes mystical messages, and a scholar with a keen sense of political realities (Nasong'o 2000, 8). His tactics and emphasis, however, changed with the changing political and social circumstances and contexts within the

United States, as well as outside, and his role in organizing the Pan-African conferences and pushing for African liberation was incomparable.

Marcus Garvey was a Jamaican who went to the US at the age of 29, and founded the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the African Communities League (ACL), and the Back to Africa Movement, the first and largest Black Nationalist movement in history. Garvey, however, was not an intellectual by any stretch of the imagination, and he sought not to promote a distinct African or Black identity, but only to parallel ideas and systems that had already been constructed by White men. While on the one hand his postulations were radically racial and militantly against European domination in Africa, on the other he was a firm believer in the capitalist system and asked, 'why should not Africa give the world its Black Rockefeller, Rothschild, Henry Ford?' He observed American capitalism, but did not see within it a movement to reform it. He became more determined to make it work than the very people who created it (Makonnen 1973, 55). He exhorted all Blacks to make every effort towards a commercial and industrial standard that would make them comparable with the successful businessmen of other races, and he took the first step by establishing his one weekly magazine *The Negro World*, a daily paper, *The Negro Times*, and setting up his own shopping line, *The Black Star Line*. He had no use for socialism and claimed that it was the greatest abomination ever inflicted on mankind. Capitalism was necessary for the progress of the world and that those who unreasonably and wantonly opposed or fought it were enemies of human advancement (Nasong'o 2000, 9).

According to Makonnen, Garvey only understood that the Black man had been a victim of slavery, and was a mere appendage to all things that had been written.

Therefore his history and race pride had to be developed. Yet Garvey mixed up his facts in his work on the African Renaissance by claiming that many men were Africans who were actually Arabs. One must pay attention to the dichotomy between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa especially regarding the history of North Africans enslaving Sub-Saharan Africans, and the simple fact that most North Africans usually did not regard themselves as Black, or harness any pride in the fact that they lived on the continent. Garvey was seemingly unaware of the pillage and tragedy of Africa south of the Sahara by those in the north. As Makonnen claimed:

He lumped together far too many of these North African poets together with other Africans and conveniently forgot that some of these poets were free from day to day to write their lines only because they had black men—*eunuchs*—in their fathers' homes who catered to their needs. For this reason, I have always been a little skeptical about Garvey and others pointing to the great Kingdoms of Timbuctoo and Ghana as a legitimate source for Black pride. I've always asked myself; were these really Black men? We must never forget that some of these desert or Sudanic people never saw themselves as real Negroes—certainly not the Tuaregs. And even with the Fulani rulers of Northern Nigeria and Cameroon, there is a feeling of separateness from the local Negro populations. They did not see themselves as Negro; they were a special caste and had been lost in the desert; lost in Africa for thousands of years, and they saw themselves as having a great impact in the formation of the kingdoms (Makonnen 1973, 55).

Garvey built on the traditions of Europeans and thought that Africa had to be united through a great spiritual nationalism, and a return to ancient greatness. He took advantage of the European and American rhetoric about World War I being a war for democracy and asserted, 'didn't we fight too, man? Our boys died in Flanders field, in Mesopotamia, and other battlefields. So are we to continue to have our chains? No' (Makonnen 1973, 56). He thus aroused the emotions of many to this great injustice and

spread his movement from the US to Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Venezuela, and elsewhere in the Diaspora and predicted, 'No one knows when the hour of Africa's redemption cometh. It is the wind. It is coming. One day, like a storm, it will be here' (Makonnen 1973, 56).

Garvey felt that within the Roman Catholic Church the idea of universalism was strong, and he sought to emulate his romantic vision of a Negro Empire after this. He eventually declared himself Provisional President of Africa and established the African Legion, an army without arms; the African Convention, a parliament of sorts that legislated by resolutions passed at flamboyant conventions and conferences, and he set up the African Orthodox Church. This exemplifies with particular clarity his extremism in his efforts to make his dream of a Pan-African Union come true. However, his ambitious business ventures that he undertook to prove that there was no difference between Blacks and Whites in terms of business and commercial acumen landed him in serious financial problems with the US government, and led to his imprisonment in 1925. He did, however, deliver a last message for his followers from his prison cell, and it epitomized the sort of mysticism in his operations:

Look for me in the whirlwind or storm, look for me all around you, for with God's grace, I shall come and bring with me countless millions of Black slaves who have died in America and in the West Indies and the millions in Africa to aid you in the fight for Liberty, Freedom, and Life (Nasong'o 2000, 11).

Garvey was a firm believer in racial purity, to which he articulated, 'I believe in a pure Black race just as how all self-respecting Whites believe in pure White race as far as that can be.' Because of his prominent African features he had an advantage over the

majority of his American political opponents who were mainly of mixed descent. He dismissed some of the leading Pan-Africanists like Du Bois as being, 'a highbred, a White Man's Nigger,' to which Du Bois described Garvey as '...a little fat, black man; ugly, but with intelligent eyes and a big head' (Nasong'o 2000, 11). These two never found a common ground as Du Bois was a Catholic scholar who exercised his influence mainly through his writings and the university lecture theater, and advocated for a 'Talented Tenth' to provide the new Black Leadership, while Garvey was an agitator and organizer who was a sectarian and lacked education, was mainly self-taught, yet supreme as an orator and appealed directly to the poor, unlettered blacks of the American urban north. Du Bois' ideas were drastically different in the sense that while Garvey conceived his African redemption program as a Back to Africa movement, Du Bois' brand of Pan-Africanism was conceived as a dynamic political philosophy, and eventually a guide to action for Africans in Africa who were laying the foundations of a national liberation organization. Du Bois was firmly against Garvey's agitation for transporting Blacks in the Diaspora back to Africa. Du Bois wanted complete self-government for Africans in Africa organized on the basis of socialism and a cooperative economy, which would not allow the existence of millionaires. National self-determination, individual liberty, and democratic socialism constituted the essential elements of Pan-Africanism as articulated by Du Bois. This diametrically opposed Garvey's vision of the establishment of a Negro Empire as a step toward nurturing the business acumen of blacks to produce their own millionaires in a capitalist system reminiscent of the West. Nonetheless it was Garvey, not Du Bois, who built the mass movement and mobilized hundreds of thousands of people. His UNIA, which was launched in 1920, is estimated to have reached a

membership of six million by 1923. He took advantage of a number of social factors to build this movement such as the great Black migrations to cities that began at the turn of the twentieth century, the post-war wave of Black lynching, and the unfulfilled promises of democracy carried home by the black veterans of World War I. To Du Bois, Garvey's dreams appeared a parody of the imperialist political economy for which Africans had paid such an enormous price since the days of the slave trade. (Nasong'o 2000, 12).

George Padmore, a Trinidadian considered to be one of the greatest champions of Pan-Africanism in the twentieth century, claimed that although Du Bois represented a political strategy of integrationism in direct opposition to Garvey's separatist Black Nationalism, Du Bois was making statements that were remarkably close to Garvey's claims in the 1920's. Du Bois even made somewhat complimentary comments about Garvey after the collapse of Garveyism, claiming that he was an extraordinary leader of his people and his movement was one of the most interesting spiritual movements of the modern world (Padmore 1972, 65).

Padmore adopted the name Padmore, for which he became internationally known after joining the Communist Party. He viewed Garvey's ideas as 'Black Zionism,' and this was the most militant expression of Black Nationalism. Initially, he claimed, Garvey advocated for social equality for Blacks, but his ideas crystallized into a peculiar ideological form of 'Negro Zionism,' which, instead of American imperialism, advanced the slogan 'Back to Africa.' This was a dangerous ideology that bore no single democratic trait, but toyed with aristocratic attributes of a non-existent 'Negro Kingdom.' Padmore argued that this ideology was strongly resisted because it did not provide help to

Blacks, but was a hindrance to the mass Black struggle for liberation against imperialism (Nasong'o 2000, 14).

Padmore thought that the fashionable trend within political circles of the Western world to ascribe any manifestation of political awakening in Africa to communist inspiration was gross hypocrisy and part of the Cold War propaganda designed to discredit African nationalists and to alienate their movements from the sympathy and support of anti-colonial elements within labor and other progressive organizations which, while friendly to the political aspirations of the colonial people, were hostile to communism. He argued that none of the African independence movements were influenced by communism and strongly demonstrated that the struggles of Africans and their dispersed offspring in the Diaspora began with their endeavors to establish a 'National Home' on the West African coast nearly a century before communist Russia emerged as a power in World Politics. Pan-Africanism as a political philosophy was intended to be a stimulant to anti-colonialism and a political reference for the newly emerging nationalist movements in Africa at a time when communist and other radical currents of twentieth century anti-imperialist ideas had not penetrated Africa. It politically sought the attainment of the government of Africans for Africans with respect for racial and religious minorities desirous of living in Africa on the basis of equality with the Black majority. Pan-Africanism subscribed to the fundamental objectives of democratic socialism with state control over the means of production and distribution. It stood for the liberty of the subject within the law and endorsed the fundamental Declaration of Human Rights with emphasis upon the Four Freedoms: freedom of

worship, freedom of speech, freedom from want and freedom from fear (Nasong'o 2000, 15).

Padmore argued that communism exploited misery, poverty, ignorance, and want, and that the only effective answer to communism was to remove these conditions by satisfying the elemental wants of the common people, which revolved around food, clothing, and shelter. James R. Hooker, a Professor of African history, claimed that until the 1930's, Padmore seemed destined to be a principal agent in the conversion to communism of the oppressed colonial peoples, and he rose to importance in the Communist Party and went to Soviet Union in 1929, attaining not only a high-ranking position in the Comintern, but also election to the Moscow City Soviet. Gradually he became disenchanted with the sincerity of communism's support for colonial freedom, as anti-colonial freedom was reduced to gain the Soviet Union a greater degree of acceptance in the West, and in 1934 he resigned from the Party. He then moved to London in 1935, which was his home until leaving for Ghana in 1957 to become Kwame Nkrumah's adviser on African Affairs. He met many Africans in London who wanted to lead their countries to independence, and from this group emerged the new creed of Pan-Africanism, with Padmore as one of its leading apostles and publicists. Padmore and Du Bois, unlike most other Diasporan leaders, remained in the forefront of the movement even after the nature of the movement entered its second phase and it shifted to the African continent.

There is a long list of other early Pan-African thinkers who contributed to Pan-Africanism in some way, whether practically or ideologically. One cannot discuss every individual because many of the thinkers who fundamentally shaped the ideas and tenets

of Pan-Africanism never heard the term 'Pan-African,' or its derivative 'Pan-Africanism,' in their lives. The fact that the term Pan-Africanism is the embodiment of so many ideas, interpretations, policies, and understandings accounts for its incoherence. What cannot be disputed is that the seeds of Pan-Africanism were implanted the second that Western and African contact took place and Africa then found itself in a Western capitalist system whirlwind. Africa has yet to escape this.

Chapter 2

From the Diaspora to the Mainland

The division among leaders and inherent ambiguity of Diasporan Pan-Africanism was also apparent in continental Pan-Africanism. Various regional organizations, and finally the Organization of African Unity (OAU), formed that were intended to symbolize Pan-Africanism in practice, but fell short of fulfilling continental unity. As African states struggled to gain independence from European powers, especially after Africans fought in World War II and thereafter were disillusioned by the lack of freedom in their homelands, Pan-Africanism shifted ideologically to a movement concerned with achieving African liberation and continental unity. This would be achieved by returning to a glorified African pre-colonial past, but this reversion had to be balanced with modern political and economic advancement. New leaders claimed that this could be realized through a unique brand of socialism—African Socialism. This brand of socialism, according to many African leaders, was the main tenet of Pan-Africanism because only through a uniquely African philosophy, unpolluted by Western ideology, could unity be achieved. Yet before most African states attempted to implement African Socialism, intense intra-state disputes persisted as newly independent states disagreed on how to achieve integration. On one hand, leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana wanted total continental political and economic unity, while others sought a loose federation or organization like the compromised Organization of African Unity that emerged in 1964.

The movement became a manifestation of factionalism and opposition as the Cold War influence and grave ideological differences triggered division among African states.

Nkrumah vocalized the need for non-alignment, but with all independent states in their infancy, most could not avoid the ideological pressure from the east and the west. Efforts to harmonize the contending views on African unity culminated in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May of 1963, which was a compromise organization. On the whole, the OAU aimed at a kind of unity that transcended ethnic, cultural, religious, and national boundaries, yet the signing of the OAU charter constituted a departure from Pan-Africanism envisaged by Kwame Nkrumah since idea of establishing a United States of Africa was sidelined. Instead, each African State was given legal protection to enjoy its independence without let or hindrance, and to develop its own identity (Nasong'o 2000, 37).

This chapter will discuss how factionalized the Pan-African movement became immediately upon its shift to the African continent, which, as will be examined in upcoming chapters, impeded the implementation of African Socialism as the first step toward total continental integration.

The Second Phase of Pan-Africanism

Du Bois organized a Fifth Pan-African Congress at the end of World War II in October 1945 in Manchester England. He was 73 years of age and while he remained a moving spirit behind the Congress, he played a much less active role than he had in the past. For the first time in the history of Pan-Africanism, the initiative for the organization of the Congress was taken over by Africans themselves. African American and West Indian leaders who had pioneered the earlier Congresses had fallen into the background

as the new African leaders present were radical and militant in their pronouncements on how the issues facing Africa were to be tackled. The Manchester Congress declared that all the peoples of Africa and African descent everywhere should be freed forthwith from all forms of inhibiting legislation and influences, and be reunited with one another. Pan-Africanism had entered upon a new era that could be described as the second phase of the movement (Amate 1986, 37).

African leaders from the French-dominated territories in West and Equatorial Africa were trying to organize a united front of their own in their demand for equality with French nationals. In 1946, the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA) was launched under the leadership of Felix Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast and had 15,000 supporters, 800 of whom were delegates from the territories that constituted the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Dahomey and Togo. Chad was the only territory representing Equatorial Africa. Other territories were not granted permission from colonial authorities, and thus were not represented (Amate 1986, 38).

Other political organizations also formed across the territorial boundaries of French West Africa such as the *Parti du Regroupement Africain* (PRA) led by Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and the *Union Général des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN) led by Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea. Prior to the formation of these organizations in 1958, contact between African leaders under the different colonial regimes was minimal, even where common territorial boundaries were shared. It was not until Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Nigerian lawyer, and Gabriel d'Arbousier, a Senegalese politician, made separate statements in which they advocated the formation of a union or

federation of the West African colonies in 1958 that colonies with different colonial pasts spoke out about uniting. d'Arbousier claimed:

I think that most of us would like to spare our countries the miseries of small minded nationalism—just as we should like to spare them the misery of an economic anarchy that is without planning or subordination to the common good...African history has so far been a history of large units. But what the organizers of the old feudal states did by conquest, we in our day will do by federation and free consent...My own deep hope is that we are moving toward the federal unity of the whole of West Africa (Amate 1986, 40).

Subsequently, on 23 November 1958, Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure announced after a meeting in Accra that they had decided to merge their two states into a union, the Ghana-Guinea Union, which they said was to be the nucleus of a nation of West African States. The apparent haste with which the union was formed, and the fact that the states were not linked by any common boundaries, created doubt as to whether the leaders were serious. The significance of the announcement, however, was the fact that it was the first time that leaders of African states of different political regimes and different colonial language areas, came together to make pronouncements on the general desire for West African unity. This gave way to the desire for a wider, all embracing continental African unity. On 1 May 1959, Nkrumah and Toure signed a joint declaration in Conakry, Guinea by which they expressed their intention to broaden the basis of their union and to make it the nucleus of a wider 'Union of Independent States of Africa' to which member states would surrender portions of their national sovereignty in 'the full interest of the African community.' The Union would have one flag, one anthem and motto—the motto being 'independence and unity' (Amate 1986, 40).

After signing the declaration, Toure and Nkrumah met William V.S. Tubman of Liberia in Saniquellie, Liberia to convince him to join the union. He only agreed to the formation of a loose association to be called the Associated States of Africa. He refused to surrender part of the sovereignty of Liberia, and this view prevailed in the end when the leader signed a new declaration on 19 July 1959. At this meeting there was a clash of two tendencies. The first tendency was reflected in a desire to safeguard the just acquired independence, and the second was embodied in the drive to attain total African unity at any cost. Tubman contended that no concrete decision could be reached on such a subject with far reaching ramifications until other African states attained their independence. They agreed to hold a special conference in 1960 of all independent states of Africa, as well as non-independent states that had fixed dates to achieve independence, to discuss and work out a charter which would achieve their ultimate goal of unity between independent African states. The name of the organization to be formed under this charter would be the Community of Independent African States, and member states would continue to maintain 'their own national identity and constitutional structure...international policies, relations, and obligations.' The aim of the community would be 'to assist, foster, and speed up the total liberation of African non-independent territories...racial equality and human dignity...to bring about unity, cooperation, harmony, coherence, and mutual understanding...to build up a free and prosperous community for the benefit of its peoples and peoples of the world and in the interest of international peace and security' (Amate 1986, 41).

Kwame Nkrumah was the prime initiator of discussions intended to bring independent African states together into a political union. In 1958 he organized two

conferences in Accra. The first Accra conference of Independent African states was held in April 1958 and marked the transformation in the focus of Pan-Africanism from the realm of the romantic idealism of Marcus Garvey's "African Redemption Programme" to that of practical politics in the form of reactivated national liberation movements (Nasong'o 2000, 29). African leaders were now confident in the possibility of dismantling colonialism as Ghana and Guinea paved the way by being the first states to gain independence. This was the first time in modern history that African leaders were able to speak in one voice and articulate the need to call on colonial powers to take immediate steps to grant independence to the African territories still dominated, and to ensure that the territorial integrity of Independent African states was not violated. The conference was also a forum to express support for Algerian nationalists who were at the time fighting against French government troops for their independence. Algeria, like Kenya, Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), South Africa, and the Portuguese territories, was a settler colony with a greater European population than most African colonies. The struggle for liberation entailed more than what was required in most African states—it necessitated an armed struggle.

Leaders from the first Accra conference sent three teams of delegations to tour Europe, South America, and Central America to rally support for the Algerian nationalists. In addition, they decided to instruct their permanent representatives at the United Nations in New York to coordinate their activities in all matters affecting the African continent, to hold a summit conference of all independent states every two years, and to hold other conferences at the ministerial and technical levels as often as was found necessary (Amate 1986, 42).

Nkrumah also hosted the second conference in Accra in December 1958. This conference was at a non-governmental level and attended by delegates of more than sixty African political parties and nationalist movements. It was called the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) and was attended by, among others, Dr. Kamuzu Banda from Malawi, Tom Mboya from Kenya, Patrice Lumumba of Congo Kinshasa, Holden Roberto from Angola, Rev. Michael Scott and Patrice Duncan representing the Liberal Party of South Africa, and Ms. Louis Hooper representing the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa (Amate 1986, 42). Mboya, who was only 28 at the time, was chair of the conference and represented Kenya, which remained under the yoke of colonialism. He asserted:

At Accra in December 1958 inspired by the earlier conference, African leaders of political parties, trade unions, and other organizations met for the first time. This was a nationalist convention and as chairman I was privileged to observe at close quarters the dedication of the leaders to the struggle for liberation. From this conference every leader went away committed to Pan-Africanism and pledged to work for the unity of the African continent (Mboya 1964, 154).

The AAPC set up a permanent secretariat in Accra with George Padmore as its first Secretary General. Subsequently, the conference organized a series of All-African conferences in other African capitals such as Tunis in 1959 and Cairo in 1961. The secretariat sought to consolidate youth throughout Africa into various bodies, such as organizations of students, teachers, journalists, writers, peasant farmers, and trade unionists. Of these organizations, the All-African Farmers Council, and the Pan-African Union of Journalists were among the most successful (Amate 1986, 42).

West Africa appeared to be the focal point of Pan-Africanist efforts, but East and Central Africa were also initiating their own movements. Prior to independence, political

parties and nationalist movements from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi met at Mwanza in Tanzania to form what they called the Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). The leading persons behind this movement were Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Milton Obote of Uganda; they were the leaders of the East African territories all going through a series of constitutional changes leading them to independence. The immediate goal of PAFMECA was to form a federation of all its member territories when they became independent. They claimed this was the first step to eventual total continental integration and unity. To this end they expanded the regional base of the movement in 1962 when they invited neighboring territories to join them in what they now called the Pan-African Movement of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). The additional countries that joined the union were Ethiopia, Congo Kinshasa, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, and South Africa. The core continued to be Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania as colonialism had linked them together by common services in transportation, communication, and statistics, which were centrally administered. At a summit meeting in Nairobi in 1963 of the East African Common Services Organization (EASCO), the Prime Ministers of the three countries declared through their spokesman, Prime Minister (and later President of Kenya) Jomo Kenyatta:

We, the leaders of the people and governments of East Africa assembled in Nairobi on 5 June 1963, pledge ourselves to the political federation of East Africa. Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism and not by mere selfish interests. We are nationalists and reject tribalism, racialism, and inward-looking politics. We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step towards

the goal of Pan-African unity. We share a common history, culture, and customs which make our unity both logical and natural (Amate 1986, 43).

Conflicts of Interest

The second conference of independent African states was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1960. Fifteen states were represented including Cameroon, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and the Algerian provisional government in exile. The signatories of the Saniquellie declaration tried to persuade attendees to adopt their declaration as the basis of discussion at the conference, but other countries, such as Nigeria, refused. The debate centered on the form that African unity should take, and there was sharp division among those present. On the one hand, Ghana and Guinea wanted to establish African unity on the basis of firm political integration and, on the other hand, countries such as Nigeria and Liberia wanted only a common platform on which independent African states could coordinate their efforts for the achievement of their common objectives (Amate 1986, 44).

Two months after the Addis Ababa conference, all the territories under French colonial rule in West and equatorial Africa became independent. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who became president of the Ivory Coast, invited the leaders of independent states to a conference in Abidjan in October 1960. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the possibility of the newly independent states to use their offices to mediate the war of independence happening in Algeria between the Algerian nationalists and the French government. However, the focus of the conference shifted from this discussion and addressed what could provide the basis for future common action for cooperative

development in their respective states. To follow up, leaders decided to have a conference in Brazzaville, Congo. The purpose of the meeting was to achieve progress on the road to inter-African cooperation founded on neighborhood culture and community of interests to work effectively towards the maintenance of peace of Africa and the new world. A commission was to be set up composed of a maximum of three representatives from each state to study and propose a plan of economic action and development. In regards to the Franco-Algerian war, the conference called for action upon the principle of self-determination to end the war, and it rendered homage to French President Charles De Gaulle (Amate 1986, 45).

Another pressing issue was The Congo Kinshasa crisis. Immediately after independence in 1960, Congo's army mutinied over its terms and conditions of service. This caused civil strife in the provinces and led to the secession of Katanga province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe, and the intervention of the United Nations to restore order and the effective use of the central government. The Brazzaville group, which consisted of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, supported then President of Congo, Joseph Kasavubu in his quarrel with Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba regarding the UN in Congo Kinshasa. Belgium had flown troops into Congo Kinshasa to rescue Belgium nationals and military officers against whom Congo troops mutinied. The group denounced outside military involvement and urged the UN to limit itself to its 'technical assistance' and not substitute for the Congolese authorities. Lumumba asked the authorities to leave due to their inability to end the chaos, and to be replaced with Soviet troops. President Kasavubu refused and countermanded the request for the

withdrawal of the UN troops (Nasong'o 2000, 33). The Brazzaville meeting ended by concluding that 'the practical solution to the problem could be found at a round-table conference, which would group together the representatives of every party without exception' (Amate 1986, 45).

Five days after the Brazzaville conference ended on 19 December 1960, leaders from Ghana, Guinea, and Mali met and discussed how the new Brazzaville alliance jeopardized the unity of Africa and strengthened neo-colonialism. Moreover, they decided to establish a tight union with a common economic and monetary policy. Later they changed the name Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union to the Union of African States (UAS). They were also incensed by the position taken by the Brazzaville group on Mauritania's independence and admission to the UN. Mauritania, under the leadership of President Mouktar Ould Dada, was being claimed as territory of King Sidi Mohammed V of Morocco, who, with the help of the Russian veto at the UN Security Council, barred the admission of Mauritania into the UN after Mauritania gained independence in 1960. The Brazzaville Conference expressed their disapproval of this use of the veto and invited 'all African states anxious for the dignity and liberty of Africa to avoid the Cold War on our continent and to redouble their efforts for the admission of Mauritania into the UN' (Amate 1986, 46).

Infuriated by the position taken by the Brazzaville group on Mauritania's independence and admission to the UN, King Sidi Mohammed invited the Presidents of Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Mali, the King of Libya, and the Prime Minister of the Algerian Provisional government to a conference in Casablanca in January 1961. With the

exception of King Idris of Libya, all were present at the conference and together became known as the Casablanca group against the Brazzaville group (Amate 1986, 47).

The Casablanca group passed resolutions that were diametrically opposed to those of the Brazzaville group. On the general issue of the liberation struggle in Africa, the Casablanca conference took a radical position. It committed itself to giving financial and material assistance to nationalist movements fighting guerilla wars against their colonial rulers.

Africa had traveled a long way to establish the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The journey was generally without any grave adverse incidents. With the emergence of these two groups with diverging and antagonistic views, the danger-signs of a possible showdown between a divided, as opposed to a united, Africa were in full swing. Even more detrimental was the fact that the groups were becoming identified with the two antagonistic ideological blocs of the great powers engaged in the Cold War. To reverse this catastrophic trend, President Tubman of Liberia invited all the Heads of Independent African states to a summit conference to be held in Monrovia in 1961. The necessary invitations were issued, yet the conference was boycotted by Guinea and Ghana. Their explanation was that they did not consider that adequate preparations had been made. Meanwhile, all the Brazzaville states were represented along with Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia, and Liberia—twenty states all together. The Monrovia conference more or less endorsed the decisions made at the Brazzaville conference, and subsequently members became known as the Monrovia group. In contrast to the Casablanca conference, the Monrovia conference placed emphasis on:

Absolute equality of African and Malagasy states...non-interference in the internal affairs of member states...cooperation throughout Africa based on tolerance, solidarity, and good-neighborly relations, periodical exchange of views, and non-acceptance of any leadership... The unity the conference aimed at was not political integration of sovereign African states, but unity of aspiration and action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity (Amate 1986, 50).

Casablanca leaders also boycotted a follow-up conference in January 1962 at Lagos, Nigeria on the grounds that leaders from the Algerian Provisional government were not invited. The Lagos conference resolved to hold the next summit meeting at Addis Ababa, which was held in May 1963. It was at this meeting that the inception of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) took place. Thirty out of the thirty-two then independent African states signed its charter. The two excluded states of Morocco and Togo later signed the charter as founding members of the OAU. Thus, the OAU was a tangible product of the evolution of Pan-Africanism.

The Divided States of Africa

The OAU charter was a compromise that leaned towards the interests of members of the Monrovia group. The leaders who participated in the founding of the organization did not reach an agreement on the fundamental question of the nature the course of African unity should take. Nkrumah and the Casablanca group envisaged African Unity in terms of political federation and the formation of a USA—United States of Africa. His contemporaries viewed his calculated scheme to amalgamate the states as his personal drive to reign over his prospective United States of Africa. His fervent search and advocacy for the formation of a USA was viewed as imperialist in nature with the

ultimate objective of Nkrumah being to perpetuate his own hegemony over the whole continent for his scheme of things, with all roads of the Pan-Continental union leading to Accra, Ghana. Former Monrovia members urged for a functionalist approach to African unity through socio-cultural and economic cooperation. The OAU charter was signed in Addis Ababa in 1963. The aims of the OAU were stipulated within it. The aims were enumerated in Article II, as follows:

- To defend and promote the unity and solidarity of the African States.
- To protect their sovereignty.
- To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa
- To coordinate and intensify the cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for Africans.
- To promote international co-operation having due regard to the UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

According to Article III, OAU member states were governed by the following principles:

- Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, arbitration, mediation, and conciliation.
- Sovereign equality of all member-states.
- Non-interference in the internal affairs of member States.
- Affirmation of the policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The charter further established the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government as the supreme organ of the OAU: the Council of Ministers, the General

Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. The Council of Ministers had the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly and coordinating African cooperation and approving the organization's budget which was prepared by the Secretary General. Questions of interpretation of the charter were to be settled by a two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government (Nasong'o 2000, 37).

For those committed to the Pan-African ethic of the Casablanca group, the signing of the OAU charter constituted a betrayal of the ideals of Pan-Africanism and total continental integration. By no stretch of the imagination did Monrovia leaders intend to build an Africa that not only was connected culturally, but in the physical sense that one could travel from a city such as Mombasa, Kenya to Lagos, Nigeria on a Super-Highway. Once there, this individual could use currency accepted in every African State, and not worry about immigration hassles because Africans would have universal passports. One would not have to import anything from outside of Africa because Africa's vast resources were in abundance. With the maintenance of the boundary status quo and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states, the colonial legacy was being perpetuated under the guise of respecting territorial integrity. The Federalist approach was Nkrumah's theory to overcome boundary problems that were bound to arise after independence given the haphazard way in which African states were partitioned by Western colonizers who paid no attention to ethnic, religious, or cultural constituencies. With such an emphasis on non-interference, it was apparent that most African leaders simply were not ready to form a unified continent. The role of the intervention of the OAU in conflict areas in Africa was circumscribed by the provision in

Article III of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The ambiguity in the Charter meant that there was no accompanying clause to elucidate what acts constituted interference in internal affairs.

Further, leaders felt that this proposed union simply was not feasible. States were in utter states of poverty and internal issues such as tribalism and literacy had to assume priority over integration. Nyerere held this view and thought that while Nkrumah was a visionary who had the best interest of Africa in mind, his ideals simply were impractical. Unlike others who questioned the motivation of Nkrumah, Nyerere simply doubted his pragmatism. The two leaders alike were regarded as the most driven Pan-Africanists on the continent, yet they battled with each other over the best approach towards the attainment of the objective. It certainly was ironic that the sharpest dissonance on the subject of unity occurred not between those who spoke of the impossibility and undesirability of the union and those who contended that union was necessary and inevitable, but within leaders within the same movement—fighting for the same cause. The essence of this divergence was in Nkrumah's push for the immediacy of the goal while Nyerere with equal zeal pushed for its attainment incrementally.

Nyerere was the most eloquent proponent of the gradualist approach and claimed that African unity could not be achieved 'in one step,' that it was 'too big a step to take at once. Just as African independence had been a process, so African unity was bound to be a process' (Agyeman 1975, 654). To Nkrumah, to suggest that the time was not yet ripe for considering such a government for Africa was 'to evade the facts and ignore the realities in Africa today...and it was to refuse to recognize the imperative needs of the Africa continent or the overwhelming wishes and desires of the people of

Africa...Nothing but groundless fear and doubts could stop Africa from building a real practical union...Fears from traitors and make us lose what we might achieve by fearing to attempt...What else are we waiting for?' (Agyeman 1975, 654)

Nkrumah believed that the idea of regionalism was fraught with many dangers, and opposed the East African Union and Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar, which he called the Balkanization of East Africa. While regional unity may have been good in itself, it would reduce the impetus for a more ambitious degree of integration.

Writer Baffour Ankomah compared Europe and the formation of the European Union to what prospectively could have happened in Africa if such a union could form to provide stability and peace in Africa. At a PADA (Organization for Peace and Appropriate Development for the Horn of Africa) conference in Amsterdam in 1999, he asserted:

Forty-one years ago, in 1958, the treaty of Rome was signed which gave way to the European Union. We have all seen what that Union has done to Europe. The last major war fought by Europeans against Europeans ended some 54 years ago. Even then they called it World War II...Borders have come down in Europe. Free movement of EU citizens is assured. I hear there is a common agricultural policy. There is common currency. There is a common European bank...Europeans can afford to sleep comfortably in their beds knowing that war cannot break out easily as it used to before the EU was born...Why doesn't Africa need the OAU, which, with patience, may one day deliver an African union on the lines of the European Union (Ankomah 2000, 7).

He further contended that at the founding of the OAU, the union was reduced to a charter and toothless organization the very next day. He went on:

Anytime I think about the lost opportunity, and the role Europe and America played in getting African leaders to reject the union idea, I ask myself: 'if union is

good for Europe (as proved by the European Union) and America (as proved by the United States of America), why did Europe and America destroy the African union idea? Before we get emotional, please let's look at what Nkrumah was pleading to do...A union government of African States, a common economic and industrial program for Africa, an African common market and common currency, monetary zone, central bank, continental communications system, common citizenship and African high command...Isn't this what the Europeans and Americans have done? So why did the same people frustrate the African union idea? (Ankomah 2000, 7)

Indeed, the West tried ceaselessly to impede the movement from advancing.

States that wanted to attend summits and conferences that were not yet independent were normally forbidden to go. The prospect of Africa uniting on a continental level meant that smaller countries would be empowered and Africans would rely on their own resources. This was unthinkable to the West because Africans would protect their resources and prevent exploitation of them, no longer looking to Europeans, but to themselves. Nkrumah realized this and thought only through immediacy could continental integration be achieved. As he claimed in his speech given on the eve of the founding of the OAU:

Our capital flows out in streams to irrigate the whole system of Western economy. 50 per cent of the gold in Fort Knox at this moment, where USA stores its bullion, is believed to have originated from our shores. Africa provides over 60 percent of the world's gold. A great deal of the uranium for nuclear power, of copper for electrics, of titanium for supersonic projectiles, of iron and steel for heavy industries, of other raw materials for lighter industries—the basic economic might of the foreign power—come from our continent. Experts have estimated that the Congo Basin alone can produce enough food crops to satisfy the requirements of nearly half the population of the whole world and here we sit talking about regionalism, talking about gradualism, talking about step-by-step. Are you afraid to tackle the bull by the horn (Ankomah 2000, 20)?

With science and technology, Africa would accumulate machinery and establish steel works, iron foundries and factories, and link the various states with communications

by land, sea and air. Africa would 'cable one place to another and astound the world with its hydro-electric power; drain the marshes and swamps, clear infested areas, feed the under-nourished, and rid the people of parasites and disease...harness the radio, television, giant printing presses to let Africans out of illiteracy' (Ankomah 2000, 21).

Theoretically, Nkrumah's vision seemed ideal, even utopian. One cannot speculate on the practical means that would have been taken to achieve this unity because it remained a vision, and unrealized dream. It is convenient to say that Pan-Africanism had not been realized simply because of irreconcilable ideological differences between leaders, or the need for states to address domestic problems first, or the need to maintain relationships with Western powers, and respect territorial integrity. The unbending need that drove Nkrumah to preach African solidarity began with the first contact with Africa and the west. Prior to it, to whom would Africans have to prove that collectively they were one, and divided they were nothing, or that by marinating territorial boundaries constructed during colonialism, African states were merely the appendages of European powers? To whom would Kwame Nkrumah seek to prove that Africa would astound the world?

Pan-African Origins Reconsidered

To understand its failure, it is necessary to return to Pan-African origins and reconsider the preposterous claim that Africa and Africans were deprived of any notable historical past, as rationalized by Europeans who ventured to control all facets of the

continent and people, resulting in an internalized feeling of inferiority among Africans throughout the world.

A need to prove that Africa did, in fact, have a past with civilizations that preceded those in Europe, and were more advanced, was roused. Yet 'advanced' and 'sophisticated' relied on European models and notions of what features accounted for advanced. Africans used these standards to measure their degree of historical advancement and refute outrageous European claims, and by doing so undermined the true Pan-African ethic of upholding a distinct and independent African identity and worldview. In effect, they further rationalized European claims by failing to promote inherently African ideals that Europeans themselves may have sought to emulate. Historical interaction among blacks and whites throughout the world culminated in the emergence of a Pan-African ideology that was inherently contradictory due to its adoption of Western standards to evaluate Africa's historical progress.

Olaudah Equiano vehemently maintained that his ethnic group, the Igbo, like the Jews, were the chosen people and of Hebrew origins, which thus accounted for their advancement. After taken from his native Iboland and enslaved in the West Indies, he lived among Europeans and traveled widely as a sailor. By the time he was able to buy his freedom and move to England, he could describe African society in Western terms and portray a glorified historical experience, and felt compelled to do so because of prevailing Western notions of African historical primitiveness. Claims of Jewish or Egyptian origins implicitly were means to avoid claims of sub-Saharan origins, which were branded inferior in the eyes of the West. The value in this case was twofold. First, it established a historical nature of the Igbos as being the chosen people, a notion that

Europeans understood, but nonetheless rejected in terms of Igbo origins. Second, it reached Africans in the face of adversity and ensured them that, irrespective of their plights, they would eventually flourish. While he championed the notion that Africans were superior and promoted a feeling of Pan-African (although not labeled so at the time) pride, he did so within a context constructed by the west, and obscured African history to fit these alien standards.

The rationalization of Jewish or Egyptian origins—and fervent efforts to rationalize Egypt as an ancient Black African civilization at the expense of uplifting other ancient civilizations that may not have preceded Egypt, but were equally as important historically and culturally—was the premise that Pan-Africanism was founded on. Rarely were sub-Saharan myths of origins such as the Ideal Downstream of the Kuba people of Central Africa glorified for their contribution to a moral system that was inherently African. Moreover, myths explained metaphysical worldviews in metaphorical terms. They further described early systems of political organization and moral guidelines in African societies and explained life, death, and religion in language that the West could not understand, and were therefore deemed backward and devoid of historical accuracy. If these original African worldviews were manifest in a distinctive African ideology free from European pollution, then such would reflect a pure Pan-African ideology.

To downplay the role that ancient Egypt played as the initiator of Western Civilization is futile, but likewise the sole claim that Greco-Roman societies emerged due to contact with Egypt should not be indicative of a more progressive civilization by virtue

of this initiation. If it were not for Egypt, would Africa be destitute of other civilizations to praise, or can only societies that launched Western civilization be credited?

Colonialism succeeded in Africa because Africans were convinced that they needed to be enlightened, and the colonial system was necessary for further development. Slavery also internalized inferiority as slaves were convinced that they were assuming their God-given roles, and Biblical references further justified these claims. It was necessary for Africans and their Diasporan counterparts to grasp that history in Africa was only an account of Europeans in Africa, and Africa was therefore a construct of Europe. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt deepened notions of Egyptian superiority and the rejection of such sophistication as being African, in the same way that Great Zimbabwe could not be the architectural work of Africans. In the midst this subjective treatment, Africans challenged these widespread European professions such as Egypt not being an ancient Black African civilization, or The Great Zimbabwe not being the work of Africans. How else could they reach the Europeans who were indifferent to the other African civilizations that they deemed backward, and how else could the pride of Africans be restored?

European penetration also necessitated that Africans, such as the Baganda of what is now Uganda, situated their history in time and space so that the British could not justify settlement as they did in Kenya in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. King lists had to provide authoritative evidence of their history and cultural distinctiveness from other groups. They had to give more validity to their traditions and make themselves appear to be more established, so king lists filled in the gaps for the story of Kintu, a myth of Origin among Baganda people. He was put into a timeframe,

and made him a historical figure as opposed to just a mythical one. These lists were not natural to oral societies, but nonetheless were necessary preventative measures to take to avoid British overthrow. This interaction forced the Baganda to obscure their history to protect what was theirs. The Baganda now viewed themselves as more advanced than neighboring groups because they had the backing of the British, who from the onset claimed that they were comparatively superior because of their Arabic literacy and political organization. Now this support was strengthened as they provided material evidence of their history and could now boast about how advanced they were for an 'African society.'

As Pan-African ideology developed into the twentieth century, it increasingly became a rejection of the contention that races were unequal, a focus on ancient Egyptian civilization as proof that Africans could produce an advanced culture, and an emphasis on single individuals who had succeeded against all odds, sounding like a reiteration of the Western capitalist notion of pulling yourself up from your own bootstraps. Leaders ardently endeavored to prove that races were all equal and, if given the opportunity, Blacks would flourish in the same way as Whites. White/Black interaction and the predominance of the former made restoring the collective African personality unattainable, and portraying African excellence within a Western framework the norm. Countless attempts were made to trace origins back to what the Europeans regarded as Afroasiatic, and hence not wholly African, such as Dr. Danquah of Ghana and his efforts to prove that the Akan peoples were the true descendants of the former Ghana Empire, which, according to European scholarship was historically occupied by Afro-Asiatic people, not entirely Africans. The key leaders within the movement were educated and

socialized within a Western system, which became apparent in their inspirations for Black people.

Colonialism and Africa's entrance into the Western capitalist system was irreversible, just as it was impossible for Africans to recapture or interpret their remarkable histories in a way that was not obscured by Europeans. Africans in the Diaspora were deprived of their African historical experience, and therefore could not embrace it. Within this context constructed by the West, Africans lost touch with who they were, and therefore could not assess their advancement in terms of their own. Leading Pan-African thinkers, such as Nyerere, argued that Africa's brief encounter with colonial penetration was only on the fringe, and Africa's glorious past could be renewed. Modern history has shown, however, that what very well may have been Nyerere's romanticized African glorious past is far from being revived. This, then, is and was the dilemma of Pan-African thought and the movement. When something has been taken away from you, or obscured, how can you embrace it? Nyerere tried to lead Tanzania toward African Socialism as a means to achieve Pan-Africanism because he believed that Africans still possessed within themselves a Pan-African ethic that Western interaction did not take away. The next chapter will prove, however, that he failed in his endeavor to restore this ethic when he embarked on his socialist mission. At independence in 1961, Tanganyika (later Tanzania) was nearly the poorest country on the world's poorest continent. Such economic circumstances had to be considered when advancing socialism, and the next two chapters will address economic obstacles to the implementation of African Socialism.

Chapter 3

Ujamaa and the Pan-African Ideal

Pan Africanism seeks the attainment of the government of Africans, by Africans, and for Africans...Economically and socially, Pan-Africanism subscribes to the fundamental objectives of democratic socialism, with state control of the basic means of production and distribution. It stands for the liberty of the subject within the law and endorses the Fundamental Declaration of Human Rights, with emphasis upon the Four Freedoms...Pan-Africanism sets out to fulfill the socioeconomic mission of communism under a libertarian political system...for there is slowly arising a strong brotherhood throughout the world. (Padmore 1972, 21-22).

George Padmore remained in the forefront of the Pan-African movement as it shifted from a primarily Diasporan movement and ideology to one concerned with African liberation and unity. As he asserted in the quote, Pan-Africanism subscribed to the fundamental objectives of democratic socialism, which became one of the three streams within the movement.

In the 1960s, African Socialism emerged in Africa and, according to many leaders, was the path for independent states to take toward total integration. African Socialism was not the product of a single thinker, and no single leader distinctively and uniquely identified with the ideology. It became the product of diverse leaders operating within a variety of exigencies in their own countries, which contributed to the lack of development of a single unified theory. Yet no one promoted African Socialism the way that Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, and later Tanzania, did. While Kenya and other African states were riddled with factionalism and unable to fulfill the Pan African ideal, Nyerere made a conscious effort to articulate a strong ideology of African Socialism and national unity, which would pave the way for continental unity. His fervent quest for

Pan-Africanism and unswerving commitment to Tanzania's version of Socialism, Ujamaa, were enshrined in Tanzania's key policy document, the Arusha Declaration of 1967, and within his explicit social philosophy. Critics of Nyerere focus on his development policies and their failures, contesting that Ujamaa and villagization were forces of economic retardation that kept Tanzania backward. This chapter, however, will address Nyerere's commitment to seeing the ideals of Pan-Africanism realized by focusing on his clear social philosophy and achievements in nation-building and promoting a sense of national consciousness and spirit within Tanzania. Nyerere's efforts to reconstruct the post-colonial Tanganyikan state and his clear policy statements in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 attest to his firm Pan-African ethic. Before analyzing these, it is first necessary to attempt to broadly define African Socialism and Tanzania's version, Ujamaa.

African Socialism Defined

The first question one may ask in regard to African Socialism is why there is a differentiation in the name from other kinds of socialism. Initially, socialists in Africa did not regard their positions as particularly distinctive, and simply accepted the orthodox view that socialism was a doctrine that defined the interests of the proletariat against an exploitative bourgeoisie. It then occurred to them, however, that there was a unique African character among Africans. This led to a rejection of all things originating from the metropolitan powers, and the emergence of the name 'African' to distinguish what they deemed inherently African from 'scientific socialism.' It is necessary, however, to understand African Socialism as both an outcome of a specific matrix of historical

conditions and as at least a distant descendant of Marxism, although many self-proclaimed African Socialists would reject this claim. As C.L.R. James, a Pan-Africanist and Marxist historian, has written, 'Marxism is a guide to action in a specific system of social relations which takes into account the always changing relationship of forces in an always changing world situation' (James 1977, 74). The post-colonial African situation was in no way comparable to that of early twentieth century Russia or nineteenth century Western Europe, so socialism in Africa was driven beyond the parameters of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy (Metz 1982, 377).

There are three major tenets of the intellectual context of African Socialism that provide the foundation for a better understanding of the phenomenon: (1) the ethics of pre-colonial Africa which were based on humanistic values and often an egalitarian method of production and distribution; (2) the colonial past which challenged the ethics of the pre-colonial system with those of capitalism; and (3) the present, representing a stage of incomplete synthesis, mixing elements of the colonial and pre-colonial past. In theory, African Socialism was based on the contention that the results of the capitalist mode of production—the potential to fulfill human needs—could be separated from the ethics of capitalism, which were based on social hierarchy and exploitation. It was thus an attempt to blend what were perceived as the dominant ethics of pre-colonial society with the productive power of modern capitalism (Metz 1982, 378).

African Socialism represented a set of dimensions to which Africans gave specific content as they tried to work their problems out on a day-to-day basis. A great deal of experimentation was taking place in Africa as new nations were passing through different levels of development and needed to meet their different situational demands.

As an ideology, it was flexible by virtue of its lack of coherence, and made room for a leader like Nyerere to focus on projects that operated mainly at the village level for community development while Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana put much more emphasis on the creation of modern economic institutions in which the state played a dominate role (Friedland and Rosberg 1964, 2).

Part of the search for a specific African Identity involved discovering ostensible roots of African Socialism in indigenous society. Nyerere felt that embracing African Socialism was merely reverting to the way things were in Africa's antiquity—prior to the advent of European colonialism. His theoretical starting point was that Africa had always contained indigenous socialism. Among various elements of African Socialism inherent in traditional society were the communal ownership of land, the egalitarian character of society and very low degree of stratification, and the external network of social obligations that led to considerable cooperation. He repeatedly articulated how African Socialism, and specifically Ujamaa, differed from what was labeled scientific socialism, and how some African leaders wrongly felt that they needed approval to launch socialist systems that differed necessarily from foreign models. To Nyerere, it was vital to espouse a very clear and easily understood statement of philosophy and policy regarding Tanzania's form of African Socialism so as to avoid causing problems and confusion because, initially, the implications of his broad commitment to socialism were not understood. He saw socialism as an incremental process that was not built by Government decisions, acts of parliament, nationalizations, or grand designs on paper. It was a long process, one that required initially describing a country's goal and what socialism meant. Ujamaa was chosen in the case of Tanzania to describe their specific

form of socialism, which, according to Nyerere, was inherently African. Its principles had endured, but needed to be rekindled by the people of Tanzania.

'Ujamaa' was chosen for very special reasons. First, it was Kiswahili, and therefore an African word that stressed the African-ness of the policies Tanzania intended to follow. Its literal meaning is 'family-hood,' and that brought to the minds of the people the idea of mutual involvement in family as they knew it. According to Nyerere, the family in Africa's past was of unparalleled importance. This emphasis on growth from traditional patterns of social living meant that the Tanzanians sought to create something that was uniquely theirs, by methods that were unique to Tanzania. Nyerere believed that socialism was international and its ideas and beliefs related to humans in society, not just to the Tanzanian in Tanzania. If not, how could the doctrine encompass humans as they were and rightly recognize factors like different geographies and histories? Claiming that it needed to demand the remolding of man to a single pattern or model was absurd to Nyerere. Instead, the universality of socialism could only exist if it took account of various differences in individuals and societies, and was equally valid for all of them (Nyerere 1968, 2).

Colonial Tanganyika

Few African territories experienced colonialism under more than one European power. Otto von Bismark, the Imperial Chancellor of Germany, decided to create a German colony in East Africa on the 23rd of February, 1885. The underlying motivation for this expansion was Germany's industrialization and its unification in 1871. It now had the material power for overseas expansion and an economy with a growing need for

governmental management. The government increasingly wanted to take advantage of any opportunity to advance economic growth and stability, and such an opportunity lay in overseas markets (Iliffe 1979, 88).

Although initially reluctant to expand because of his desire to preserve Germany's social order amidst industrial change, Bismark realized that stability depended on expansion rather than resisting change, and set off to build an overseas empire like Britain's. In 1884, he established German protectorates in southwest Africa, Togo, and the Cameroons. Historically in East Africa, German interests were in Zanzibar, with whom they had traded since 1847. It was peculiar, therefore, that Germany added an East African Protectorate in 1884. He stated, 'to acquire territory is very simple in East Africa. For a few muskets, one can obtain a paper with some native crosses' (Iliffe 1979, 91). By the 26th of February 1885, he gained control of the German East African Company's possessions, and the company was transformed into a serious commercial undertaking by February 1887. Dar es Salaam was occupied on the 25 May 1887 and the company demanded control of customs throughout the coast, which was granted by April 28, 1888 (Iliffe 1979, 91).

German conquest was met with resistance. The leader of the coast was the Sayyid, and when the Company's agents tried to take over seven coastal towns in August 1888, violence erupted. Coastal peoples vowed to support Sayyid Khalifa and not the Germans. In the interior, resistance came from both Arab merchants who feared losing their trading routes, and village chiefs who resented the German requisition of their village labor. United by their discontent, people throughout the region formed small coastal bands through which they launched attacks on the Germans in August 1888. Two

years later, after the Germans were nearly defeated, the company established control and began building a colonial economy based on the production of export crops, especially coffee and tea. The colonial administration seized land for plantations, conscripted African laborers, and forced Africans to grow export crops on their own land. Land was also confiscated to give to nearly all the German settlers (Heath 2000, 4).

Much of the soil could not be cultivated throughout the protectorate, so when a mandate was issued in 1902 to add cotton to the list of obligatory crops, Africans rebelled against this mandate. They were already strained by colonial taxes and labor policies, so on 31 July 1905, the Matumbi people, lead by Abdullah Mapenda, initiated an attack, later called the Maji Maji Rebellion, that forced the German colonists in the southern coastal areas out of their homes. The Germans retaliated and killed between 75,000 and 120,000 Africans out of a population of two million. Shortly thereafter, the Germans gained complete control of the protectorate, which they maintained until they were defeated in World War I, whereupon Britain occupied most of German East Africa. The League of Nations gave Britain control of the territory, and it was renamed Tanganyika (Heath 2000, 4).

While technically an internationally mandated territory, Britain treated it as a new colony. By 1925, Sir Donald Cameron was governor and created a government based on indirect rule. Most ethnic groups in Tanganyika had no tradition of centralized political authority, and the British imposed an invented hierarchy on the ethnic groups and nominated chiefs to collect taxes, recruit labor, and enforce other colonial mandates (Heath 2000, 4).

Britain's economic interest in Tanganyika, a land that offered nothing comparable to South African gold or other resourceful African colonies, was limited to imperial firms based on the old German regime. One of the main aims of the British regime was to destroy the German presence, resulting in the last German leaving by 1922. Another aim included discouraging new settlers and reestablishing order in terms of producing export crops by exploiting African labor (Iliffe 1979, 262).

Unlike Kenya, Tanganyika was not as desirable to colonizers as it did not, among other things, have the rich soil or lush land, so very little was done in terms of infrastructure and development. Technically a United Nations Trust Territory after World War II, the Trusteeship Council's debates did little to influence government thinking or affect its actions. Little was done to develop an educational system that would prepare the state for independence. The number of Africans passing the school certificate examination between 1945 and 1960 was approximately half of that in Kenya, and even less than half of that in Uganda. Moreover, half of this number came in the last three years before independence. In 1960, Tanganyika had 560 doctors and 10, 453 teachers for a population of 9 million (Oliver 1976, 314-315).

By 1945, Tanganyika lacked a government economic development policy. The exigencies of war were a factor, but longer-term causes of poverty were inherent in the ambiguous colonial situation. Tanganyika was ill-educated and ill-equipped to manage its harsh environment. It had an infrastructure whose sparseness and inadequacy was remarkable even by standards of tropical Africa, and an international status so ambiguous that it discouraged investment and entrepreneurial effort. It entered the 1960s as one of

the poorest and least developed countries on the world's poorest continent (Oliver 1976, 290).

Post-Colonial Tanganyika and Ujamaa in Theory

At Independence in December 1961, Tanganyika was in an utter state of poverty. Life expectancy was 35 years, schools were extremely scarce, and most people were unable to survive on the food they raised themselves. Very few people had access to adequate health services and pure water supplies, and the country's agriculture was based almost entirely on plantations, run exclusively by European settlers. The task of developing the country was very hard since 94 percent of the population lived in villages, and the government had to find a means of communicating with the people (Moore 1996, 2).

The structure of common poverty was different than in neighboring Kenya or Uganda, as there was a complete absence of an industrial sector in the economy of Tanganyika. The pattern of settlement in East Africa meant that Nairobi developed as an industrial and commercial center for the whole area. While firms were established there and expanded their operations to sell goods throughout East Africa, Tanganyika obtained virtually no industries. Tanganyika was a free market for Kenya, and any surplus Tanganyika earned in overseas trade with other countries did not promote Tanganyikan development because it was invested in Kenya or Britain due to the status of Tanganyika as a trust territory compared to Kenya, which was a settler economy with a white population and infrastructure developed to ensure that it was the commercial center for

all of East Africa. Tanganyika could not protect its own infant industries against large-scale firms in Kenya—and to a lesser extent in Uganda (Nyerere 1968, 64).

At independence, the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which were about 35 miles away from the Tanganyikan coast, remained Britain's possessions. By 1963 when they were granted independence, Nyerere saw unification with these islands as a stride toward continental unity, and a means of rectifying the damage done by the Germans and British in East Africa. As he contended in 1964:

Tanganyika and Zanzibar are neighbors in every way...History tells us that at one time Zanzibar and a large part of mainland Tanganyika were ruled by one government, that of the Sultan of Zanzibar...Today there is great enthusiasm for unity. The peoples of our continent are anxious to become one people, with one government...In no other part of the world is there so great an urge for unity as we find in Africa (Nyerere 1967, 291-292).

In January of 1964, Zanzibar and Pemba's African majorities revolted and overthrew their hereditary Arab sheik ruler, and Abeid Karume became President of the New Republic on the Islands. Negotiations were conducted in secrecy with the Tanganyika government. After a short debate at the Special Meeting in April of 1964, the necessary legislation for unification was passed by unanimous acclamation (Nyerere 1967, 291). The republics were then unified, while maintaining considerable autonomy under the merger agreement. Zanzibar and Pemba, primarily Muslim communities, and Tanganyika, primarily Christian, formed Tanzania. Nyerere, a devout Roman Catholic, preached religious tolerance and even claimed that the Island's Afro-Shirazi Party deserved to be given precedence over his party, TANU (Tanganyikan African National Union). TANU stated:

TANU has not resolved one of the main questions—the question of the elimination of the feudal administration. This question was fully resolved by the Afro-Shirazi. This is why TANU took the decision about the socialist development of Tanzania (Johnson 2000, 4).

While Nyerere was motivated by the Afro-Shirazi party, TANU also had to uphold what they vowed to do in 1961, which was ‘the creation and strengthening of the socialist democratic state’ (Johnson 2000, 4).

Upon election to a second term in 1965, Nyerere articulated the goals that would guide his policies for the next twenty years: to bring a moral order to international affairs, and to build Tanzania into a self-sufficient nation free of neocolonial dependencies. These goals, along with many others, were enumerated two years later when Ujamaa, the practical program for building African Socialism, was first introduced in February 1967 in Arusha, Tanzania in what became known as the *Arusha Declaration*. This was the highlight of Nyerere's attempts to build socialism in Tanzania, and was accepted by the National Executive Committee of TANU. It made explicit Tanzania's socialist ideology and TANU's commitment to building one united Tanzania based the equality of citizenship. It confirmed democracy as the viable system of government at the national and Pan-African level (Nyong'o 1999, 3).

Nyerere had already been successful in deepening the sense of national consciousness among Tanzanians by making Kiswahili the national language and facilitating dialogue among the country's 120 different ethnic groups. Parliament in Dar es Salaam debated exclusively in Kiswahili, and more and more government business was conducted in Kiswahili. He achieved this goal in part by mandating that Kiswahili be universally taught in all academic contexts and demonstrated that the language was

capable of carrying the complexities of a genius of another civilization by translating Shakespeare into Kiswahili (Mazrui 1999, 3). He also declared that Tanzania would be a one party TANU state. Indeed, he received endless criticism for this move, but held that his intent was not to restrict political freedom or activity, but rather that there was no major opposition in Tanzania and that party rivalry was a foreign concept, not an African one. A one party democracy would bring people together and promote unity as opposed to 'dirty' opposition politics. He made this system work. Every five years, TANU held primaries and chose at least two candidates to run for each position in the general election. The candidates often had opposing views, and during the election process there was always lively and free debate regarding issues confronting Tanzania and throughout Africa. The voters took politics very seriously in Tanzania and had a very high turnout rate. Tanzania was among the poorest countries in Africa, yet it had a population of politically conscious and involved citizens who actively participated. People identified themselves as citizens of a social republic and not by their ethnic groups or other divisions, demonstrating how Nyerere's creation of a one-party system helped to secure that there would not be a fragmented state and party system that would be rooted in ethnic identities and division.

The Arusha Declaration set out the chief tenets of socialism as being the absence of exploitation of man-by-man, social ownership and control of the means of production, self-reliance, and good leadership. The role of the government in nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy later came to be assumed as the center-piece of the Arusha Declaration, yet there was no emphasis on this in the original document. The

emphasis was on the peasant and peasant agriculture as the basis of the socialist project (Nyong'o 1999, 3).

For Nyerere, the element of traditional life that gave his theory what has been called its 'anthropocentric' bent was the value content of production based on communalism (Metz 1982, 380). Everybody was a worker and there was no social division of labor. Socialism was much more than simply a form of political economy—the ethical content of pre-colonial Africa was most heavily utilized. Unlike Kenya's key post-colonial policy document, *The Sessional Paper #10 of 1965; African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, which prescribed a capitalist development strategy based on economic growth and reliance on Western powers, the Arusha Declaration stressed that independence meant self-reliance, and it was not ethically right to depend on Western powers because it decreased human dignity and promoted neocolonialism. Instead, the government would pursue policies that would facilitate collective ownership of the resources of the country (Arusha Declaration 1967, 2) to promote reliance on Tanzanian resources. The Policy of Self-Reliance in part three of the document stated:

We are at War. TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a whole) from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity. We have been oppressed a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about a revolution which will ensure that we are never victims of these things (Arusha Declaration 1967, 4).

The resolution to these problems did not lie in money. In fact, the document stated that money was the problem.

But it is obvious that we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapons of the economically strong—weapons which in fact we do not possess...It is stupid to rely on money as the major instrument of development when we know only too well that that our country is poor. It is equally stupid, indeed it is even more stupid, for us to imagine that we shall rid ourselves of poverty through foreign financial assistance rather than our own financial resources (Arusha Declaration 1967, 5-8).

Reliance on foreign capital would not work because: a) there was no country in the world prepared to give Tanzania gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent needed to be able to achieve all of the development targets; b) Independence could not be real if a nation depended on gifts, and such assistance would affect Tanzania's survival as a nation and; c) the development of Tanzania was brought about by people not money. Money, and the wealth it represented, was the result, and not the basis of development (Arusha Declaration 1967, 10-13).

Realizing that Tanzania was far from being a socialist state and appropriately could be labeled a state of peasants and workers, the Declaration stated that the best way to develop socialism was not through developing industries. Tanzania simply did not have the money to do so, and borrowing money to develop them would mean, 'inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our country may succeed in giving us all the industries that we need, but would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism unless we believe that without first building capitalism, we cannot build socialism' (Arusha Declaration 1967, 11-12).

Tanzania did, however, depend on loans, which TANU and Nyerere felt did not have conditions that undermined Tanzania's independence, which would be used in

towns to develop industry and schools, hospitals, and houses, and then repaid from the villages and from agriculture. The declaration stated:

What does this mean? It means that the people who benefit directly from the development which is brought about by borrowed money are not the ones who will repay the loans. The largest percentage of the loans will be spent in, or for, the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers (Arusha Declaration 1967, 12).

So, according to the Declaration, Tanzania had to be concerned with peasant farmers. They formed the basis of society and their efforts would repay loans, and provide the foreign exchange with which foreign cars were brought to Tanzania along with all other aspects of modern development in urban Tanzania. It stated that it was very important to prevent the city dwellers from exploiting the peasants, although it did not state how to prevent this relationship.

As Tanzania embarked on this socialist journey which emphasized the importance of the peasant in society, Nyerere stressed what he saw was the first and most central point under socialism: man was the purpose of all social activity. The equality of man and the upholding of human dignity were of utmost importance. To Nyerere, the word 'man' to a socialist meant all men—all human beings—male and female and all other distinctions between human beings. The existence of racialism, tribalism, or of religious intolerance meant a society was not socialist, irrespective of other socialist attributes it may have had. Socialism as a system was, in fact, an organization of man's inequalities to serve their equality. Their equality was a socialist belief. There would be no exploitation of one man by another, and no masters who sat in idleness while others

labored on 'their' farms and in 'their' factories. There also would not be a great degree of inequality between the incomes of different members of society. Public ownership was also necessary because it would ensure that there was no exploitation in the economy, and no built-in tendency towards inequalities (Nyerere 1968, 10-36).

The way to maintain socialism was to ensure that the major means of production were under the control and ownership of the peasants and the workers themselves through their government and co-operatives, and that the ruling party was a party of peasants and workers. In practice, shortly after the Arusha Declaration was released, all banks operating in Tanzania, with the exception of one Co-Operative bank, were nationalized. Taken into public ownership were also many firms engaged in the processing of food. The National Insurance Corporation of Tanzania was nationalized, among many other firms and Corporations in Tanzania.

Nyerere despised what he saw as an apparent tendency among certain socialists to try to establish a new religion—a religion of socialism itself. This is another reason why African Socialism had a distinct name: to reject how what was usually labeled as 'scientific socialism' was regarded as holy writ in the light of which all other thoughts and actions of socialists had to be judged. While this doctrine was not presented as a religion, its proponents presented their beliefs as science and talked and acted in the same way as some of the most rigid of theologians. The task of a real socialist was to think out for him or herself the best way of achieving desired ends under the conditions that existed. To talk of thinkers like Marx and Lenin as if they could provide the answers to all problems, or as if Marx invented socialism, was to reject both the humanity of Africa

and the universality of socialism. Socialism did not begin with Marx, nor could it end in constant reinterpretations of his writings (Nyerere 1968, 15).

Nyerere believed that despite the existence of a few feudalistic communities, traditional Tanzanian society was characterized by socialist ideas despite the fact that people did not see themselves as socialists and were not socialists by deliberate design. People were all workers and did not live off the sweat or exploitation of others. There was never a great difference in the amount of goods available to different members of society. All these were socialist characteristics and while there was a low level of material progress, traditional African society was in practice organized on a basis that was in accordance with socialist principles. These principles were still in prevalence in Nyerere's time as the social expectation of sharing what you had with your kinsfolk was still very strong. This, however, had nothing to do with Marx, as most people had never even heard of him. Yet these principles provided a basis on which modern socialism could be built. A real scientific socialist would use as his theoretical and practical starting point the problems of a particular society from the standpoint of that society. In the case of Tanzania, one would take the existence of some socialist values as part of material for analysis, and study the effect of the colonial attitudes on the systems of social organization, and would take into account the world situation as it affected Tanzania. Then, one would know that Tanzania did not need to go through a stage of capitalism for it to truly be socialist. Nyerere even argued that while Tanzania was part of the Western capitalist world, it was very much on the fringe. It may have inherited a few capitalist institutions and a few people adopted individualistic attitudes as a result of their

education, but the majority of people remained communally minded and were not filled with capitalist ideas (Nyerere 1968, 18).

This conception of Africans naturally being socialist formed the basis for African Socialism. Nyerere's views obviously were not met with little or no challenge. John Iliffe, a British historian of Africa, especially Tanganyika and later Tanzania, said that 'African Socialism was a mythical creature that so many historians hunted fruitlessly in the 1960s' in his book *The Emergence of African Capitalism*. He attempted to decipher whether there was a form of indigenous capitalism in African societies. By capitalism, he meant:

Classic, essentially Marxian definition: the production of goods for exchange by capitalists who combine capital and land which they own with labor power which they buy from free and propertyless workers. Capitalism, in my usage, centers on the exploitation of the labor power of free wage laborers, for, as Marx wrote of capitalism in his late life, 'the relation between capital and wage-labor determines the entire character of the mode of production.' (Iliffe 1983, 4)

Iliffe examined sub-Saharan African societies in the eighteenth centuries and found that in the West African savanna, pre-capitalist modes of production were dominant and several coexisted: domestic production by the family unit, in which the main form of exploitation was by senior men of their juniors and womenfolk; domestic production by cultivators or craftsmen within a political state which extracted surplus through tribute; and the very widespread use of slaves, especially in the vicinity of major trading centers. This diversity, according to Iliffe, of pre-capitalist modes of production was to be one of the keys to African capitalism in the twentieth century. He pointed out three kinds of hired labor that existed in the West African Savanna, namely men working as hired agricultural workers, porters—which were more common, and in the craft

industry. Also in the former Gold Coast, African merchants were those who most successfully combined economic activity of a capitalist kind with social relationships in an order style—men like George Blankson, the ‘commercial king’, who was able to ‘build a castle in his own town of Anomabu and support 100 slaves as servants to the palatial building’ (Iliffe 1983, 14)

We must remember, however, that Nyerere was not wrong when he pointed out in regards to the individual component in African economic relations, ‘to him (the African), the wage is *his* wage; the property is his property. But his brother’s need is his brother’s need, and he cannot ignore his brother’ (Friedland and Rosberg 1964, 58). The question that one must ask is who is his brother? Iliffe points out the diversity of African capitalism in the nineteenth century, and stresses even more the diversity of pre-colonial Africa; the range of different modes of productions that existed; the variety of merchant groups in terms of their origins, social situations, and commercial activities. In the three major states of Eastern Africa, the evidence of the emergence of wage relationships was mostly lacking, and this puts into context why Nyerere claimed what he did regarding the non-capitalist nature of indigenous Africa. Surely a ‘brother’ in an East African Society was different from that in a Fulani emirate or elsewhere.

Many critics of Nyerere claim that there was great historical inaccuracy in his portrayal of an ideal African traditional society. Michael Lofchie, a Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles, held that Nyerere’s model was doomed to fail because of its historical inaccuracy, and it did not correspond to the life experiences of those to whom it was being addressed. Yet by definition, a mobilizing myth does not have to be historically accurate or correspond precisely to the life

experiences of those to whom it is being addressed. In effect, Nyerere's use of egalitarian values of traditional Africa was important even if they did not correspond to the life experience of Tanzanians; the purposes of myth of communal Africa for Nyerere were transcendence and unification, not explanation. He used pre-colonial Africa not to construct an explanatory ideology, but to generate a desire to transcend an unhappy present (Metz 1982, 381).

Conclusion

Critics of Nyerere and his Ujamaa experiment may claim that Nyerere was counterproductive and responsible for economic stagnation in Tanzania. Indeed Ujamaa suffered at the hands of state bureaucrats who capitalized on the need to Africanize the economy. They used state power for self-enrichment. The economic distance between them and the peasants was inimical to democratic politics since they systematically bent the rules to seek and support their activities. They served their exploitive interests while giving lip service to socialism, and the contradictions between the governors and the governed became clear (Nyong'o 1999, 3).

Ujamaa villages were supposed to bring peasants together into productive hamlets to which the government would find it easier to provide social services and infrastructure. A whole system of incentives were used to encourage people to join these villages. There were about seven and a half thousand villages by the end of the 1970's, but the majority of them simply were not productive (Johnson 2000, 4). These villages became the instruments of state control over peasant production and lives. Bureaucrats

often pocketed resources meant to provide social services in the villages. The end result was the ruination of peasant agriculture in Tanzania and an increase in the nation's external dependency on food and aid. Peasants, in turn, disengaged from the villages and turned to independent subsistence agriculture (Nyong'o 1999, 5).

Despite his failures, Nyerere's achievements in nation building and in working ceaselessly to see the ideals of Pan-Africanism realized were unmatched. He receives minimal praise for these efforts. He did, in fact, raise the standards of social welfare above those of wealthier Kenya and Uganda. Many people realized their inherent humanity and desired not to exploit others. African Socialism was no more thunderous a failure in Tanzania than in any other country that tried to implement it, yet Nyerere receives far more criticism. He was in a class of his own in terms of ethical standards and intellectual power, and had a selfless interest to serve people throughout Africa. He was always proud of the way that he served Tanzanians and deserved the title Mwalimu, which means 'teacher' in Kiswahili and described what Nyerere did before entering politics, and how Tanzanians regarded him as more than just a leader. Nyerere said in 1996 during an interview, 'Where did you get the idea that I thought Ujamaa was a miserable failure? A bunch of countries were in economic shambles at the end of the 1970s. They are not socialist' (Johnson 2000, 6). According to Nyerere, Tanzania's problem was not socialism, but poverty. He claimed that socialism was about values such as, 'justice, a respect for human beings, a development which is people-centered, development where you care about the people...The market has no heart at all since capitalism is completely ruthless, so who is going to help the poor?' (Johnson 2000, 6)

He told the World Bank:

We took over a country with 85 percent of its adult's population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors. When I stepped down there was 91 percent literacy and nearly every child was at school. We trained thousands of engineers, doctors, and teachers (Johnson 2000, 6).

African Socialism never flourished on a continental level because its ambiguity impeded its progression as a coherent and unifying doctrine. No one else articulated an ideology as clearly as Nyerere, and his theory never became a universally African doctrine. Perhaps the greatest criticism among those who refused to accept Marxism or Leninism was because of the European nature of these theories, and that as imported ideologies, they did not suit Africa. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the impact of such ideologies on the various versions of African Socialism. With the lack of sufficient themes, or a single thinker who articulated a universal explanation of African Socialism, it was merely viewed as a set of unanalyzed abstractions. Moreover, it did not reach all leaders of Africa. While it was popular among leaders like Nkrumah, Nyerere, Leopold Sengor, and Sekou Toure—Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Tubman of Liberia, and M'ba of Gabon ignored the concept. How then, could 'African' Socialism have been an appropriate label if it was not accepted in all corners of Africa? These impediments are what accounted for the short-lived nature of African Socialism.

Chapter 4

African Socialism Unrealized: The Kenya Case

The three streams of thought apparent within Pan-Africanism--African unity, Black Nationalism, and socialism--were reflections of the objectives of the movement's early leaders such as W.E.B. DuBois and George Padmore. By the mid-twentieth century, Pan-African ideology subscribed to the fundamental objectives of democratic socialism, in particular the idea of state control of the basic means of production and distribution. By the 1960s, the elaboration of these principles in the concept of African Socialism signaled the foundation of a new political ideology that would provide the framework for newly independent African governments to redress the social inequalities and huge disparities in wealth entrenched by decades of colonial rule.

In East Africa, as discussed earlier, African Socialism was most famously promoted by Julius Nyerere, whose leadership of independent Tanzania centered on the promotion of *Ujamaa* and African communalism. Nyerere sought to institute socialism in Tanzania by, 'building on the foundation of Africa's past and emphasizing certain characteristics of traditional organization, and extending them so that they could embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable Tanzania to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world' (Nyerere 1968, 2). Indeed the wealth of secondary sources on the socialist project in post-colonial Tanzania attest to Nyerere's commitment to achieving these ideals.

In Kenya, however, there seems to have been no corresponding commitment towards defining socialist policies, despite the fact that Jomo Kenyatta and KANU

claimed to support African Socialism. While Tom Mboya, Minister of Planning and Economic Development, asserted, 'African Socialism would guarantee every citizen, whether rich or poor, full and equal political rights,' (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 84) the newly independent government faced the arduous task of formulating such policies that would not only arrest the post-independence economic depression, but also provide for the redistribution of resources necessary for the alleviation of rural and urban poverty.

To achieve this, Kenyan leaders had to address the issue of the highly export oriented economy and speak to the needs of Kenyans and ensure them that the economic decline would be reversed. Despite its declarations to the contrary, the government supported a clear strategy for economic growth that was based on a determination to keep existing ties with the former imperial powers in the West, especially Britain, and sustained both inherited colonial institutions and economic development strategies. Kenyatta's KANU (Kenya African National Union) government directed its attention toward the promotion of growth as opposed to redistribution.

This assessment will consider the policy recommendations in three key documents on national development policy: (1) the *Sessional Paper #10 of 1965*, erroneously entitled, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, (2) the KANU Manifesto of 1960 and (3) Kenya's First Five Year Development Plan. The question that this chapter poses is whether in the Kenyan context, African Socialism could provide 'full and equal' economic rights to every citizen, and thereby fulfill the fundamental requirements for the attainment of the Pan-African ideal. By comparing enumerated policies with what was actually practiced, this chapter will reveal that the KANU government, while publicly committed to socialism, pursued a manifestly

capitalist development strategy. The colonial legacy that Kenya inherited, combined with KANU's conservatism, impeded Kenya's ability to participate in the movement to achieve continental unity.

The 1950's were the decisive years in Kenya as the nation was part and parcel of the surge of African nationalism that echoed throughout the continent. The overriding objective of nationalists was the realization of African independence, and Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast spearheaded this movement. He urged young nationalists to seek first the political kingdom and the rest would be added unto them. He felt that the independence of his country was meaningless unless it was connected to the total liberation of Africa. Independence was supposed to be the stepping stone toward total continental unity, not just the regional unity that others, arguably Kenyatta and undoubtedly Nyerere, advocated. Continental unity alone would save Africans from political weakness and economic stagnation, so it was the responsibility of every leader to guide his country down the path of future African unity by instituting policies, especially socialist ones, that would encourage Pan-Africanism toward its final stage—a United States of Africa based on the model of the United States. Each African State would exist in a federation, yet maintain autonomy and sovereignty within the collective group.

While Kenyatta vocalized his support for the movement and was present at key forums such as the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, which marked the transformation of the movement from one concerned mainly with discrimination and injustice in the Americas to an African liberation movement, he may have feared 'Nkrumah's interference' as it had the potential to undermine his newly acquired power and *Uhuru* (freedom) government. Many leaders sensed that Nkrumah felt that he was

the natural person to assume the Executive position within his proposed continental government, and therefore were reluctant to support him. His drive originated in the premise that only through unity was there true strength for African countries—hence individually they were weak and could not attain economic independence or safeguard their national sovereignty. Countries were the producers of raw materials that they could not even industrialize, and without this, according to Nkrumah, sustained economic development would not be possible. This would lead to mass unemployment and eventual political unrest (Ochieng' and Ogot' 1995, 8).

Political independence necessarily had to be used as a means to redress economic and social neglect and injustices of the colonial era—especially in Kenya that not only experienced British hegemony, but was also a settler economy built around immigrant settlers and the 'White Highlands' (Sandbrook 1975, 4). Colonialism linked Africa so tightly into the world capitalist system that Western Europe, and later the USA, dominated. Through Pan-Africanism and the promotion of self-determination and reliance among African countries as opposed to European and American powers, Africa had the prospect of escaping this unhealthy dependency. There were, in fact, enterprising Africans during the colonial era, yet they did not control the economic system that they were absorbed in.

Kenya's Settler Economy

Kenya's post-colonial economy was and continues to be molded by its brief encounter with British hegemony in the period of 1895-1963. Pioneering Europeans initially came to the south-central highlands of Kenya and claimed that they discovered

uninhabited land, which they then deemed theirs as they were the first inhabitants.

Between 1895 and 1915, a colonial bureaucratic hierarchy was constructed with the lowest rung consisting of African chiefs, and white settlers in need of cheap agricultural labor at the top. In collaboration with these settlers, the colonial government endeavored to create a cheap, malleable, and readily accessible African labor force. Pioneer Kikuyu squatters looked upon the opening of the White Highlands as an opportunity for expansion as they had lost access to their land in Central Province to settlers (Kanogo 1985, 2).

European settlement began in the southern district of Kikuyu country and eventually spread to the Rift Valley where the availability of extensive "virgin" land enabled settlers to expand their territory and dominance. Kikuyu families were restricted to native reserves and allotted small plots to permit self-reliant subsistence. They were forced into formal-sector employment and families were allowed to build temporary huts and develop household gardens on European farms. This deliberate, heavy-handed manipulation of land tenure ensured white farmers a plentiful supply of cheap male labor, with women and children available when extra hands were needed. As these squatter families became more numerous and dependant on their borrowed huts and gardens, and as growing populations within fixed boundaries were denied the rights to return to home reserves, a landless and increasingly restive rural proletariat became a permanent part of the economy of the highlands (Miller and Yeager 1984, 19).

Kikuyu squatters, then, were drawn to the White highlands by dreams of wealth, and also were forced off their land due to land shortages and oppression from chiefs. Initially they operated within an economic system where they were in competition with

the settlers (Kanogo 1985, 11). This, however, was very short lived. By the 1920's, the colonial system imposed sanctions on the employed to ensure a reliable work force. Punitive hut taxes were imposed that could be worked off, or paid from the proceeds of wage labor. Kikuyus who felt that they would prosper were disillusioned when a compulsory registration system installed in 1921 required adult African males to carry certified labor passes (Miller and Yeager 1984, 18).

Africans were denied the right to cultivate major cash crops because European settlers wanted to prevent competition in the highly lucrative production of coffee and tea. The alienation of African land and the discouragement of African cash crops prevented Africans from becoming totally self-sufficient, and compelled them to seek wage employment to meet their cash needs (Kanogo 1987, 9). Settlers enjoyed the profits from the cash crops and did not address African grievances related to land and labor or the unequal distribution of resources. This later accounted for the predicament that independent Kenya faced as it needed to ensure that policies executed would not lead to economic stagnation. The landless were predominately unskilled in agricultural methods and thought that with independence, the land would be redistributed to them. KANU, however, felt it was necessary to maintain a relationship with European expatriates, as they were the major source of capital and skilled manpower.

KANU's Approach

Decolonization and an independent Kenya did not change the inequalities in the distribution of resources in Kenya. The *Sessional Paper of 1965* identified the gravest problems that independent Kenya faced in Article 54:

1. Domestic capital; 2, trained, educated, and experienced manpower; and 3, foreign exchange...to solve these problems, the nation needs to speed the growth process in order to compensate for its shortcomings of domestic capital... the real solution to this problem is to raise per capita incomes, that is...to grow faster we must save more but to save more we must grow faster (Sessional Paper 1965, 19).

This, according to the document, would ensure that individual aspirations would be realized. This entailed Kenya borrowing from foreign governments and international institutions to stimulate the inflow of private capital from abroad. The aim was to attract foreign capital to finance the local costs of development and maintain a rate of economic growth (Sessional Paper 1965, 20). Yet this only promoted reliance on foreign aid in the form of grants, loans, and technical assistance. In the agricultural sector of the economy, there was foreign control of the large coffee, tea, fruit and sisal estates even a decade after the partial resettling of landless Africans on the former European lands. Foreign control was especially dominant in the modern capitalist-intensive, technologically sophisticated, industrial sector. The key decision-makers in the manufacturing sector were non-Kenyans. Out of the fifty most influential directors of Kenyan operations within the manufacturing sector in 1967, only seven were Kenyan citizens and only four were Africans (Sandbrook 1975, 7).

In this historical context, Kenyatta had to choose an effective development strategy and declared in the introduction of the *Sessional Paper #10* that Kenya would develop through the concepts and philosophies of African Socialism, rejecting both Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism through choosing a policy of non-alignment. The entire approach was to be dominated by a desire to ensure Africanization of the economy and public service. When all was said and done, according to Kenyatta,

'Kenyans had to settle down to the job of building the Kenyan nation, and to do this the country needed political stability and an atmosphere of confidence and faith at home.'

He optimistically concluded this introduction with:

The people of Kenya should roll up their sleeves in a spirit of self-help to create the fruits of UHURU (freedom). This is what we mean by HARAMBEE (pulling together) (Sessional Paper 1965, Introduction).

In Kenya, the desire for the transformation of inherited colonial institutions was normally identified with the call for nation building, and the people of Kenya hoped that independence would mark a transition from the realm of necessity to that of building a democratic socialist state firmly devoted to Pan-African ideals. It was, therefore, not surprising that on Independence Day, Kenyatta announced that his government:

Would make this possible and the benefits of economic and social development would be distributed equitably, and that differential treatment based on tribe, race, belief, or class would be abandoned. Every national, whether black, white, or brown, would be given an equal opportunity to improve his lot (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 82).

From the beginning when Kenyatta assumed the position of Prime Minister on June 1, 1963, he was unable to convince either the less conservative members of KANU, or those who risked their lives in Kenya's pre-independence peasant revolt, Mau Mau, that he was committed to socialism. Kenyatta, unlike Nyerere, never articulated a particular social philosophy or ideology, and there was never anything comparable to a revolution after he assumed power. In the early years of independence, he showed little interest in Pan-African or international interests that would promote continental African

democracy (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 82). It became painfully clear that he was a capitalist who would guide Kenya in this direction.

His initial Independence Speech made absolutely no reference to Kenya's bloody struggle for independence or the freedom fighters of the forests and the detention camps. These fighters believed that Kenyatta had already forgotten about them because he suited the ambitions of the self-seeking politicians and diverted from the needs of the majority of Kenyans.

Furthermore, KANU faced serious ideological differences within the party that could not be reconciled. The first two years were a turbulent time of political readjustment where opposition Members of Parliament, APP (African People's Party) and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) joined KANU, and immediately strengthened the conservative wing of the party. Oginga Odinga, the former Vice-President of Kenya who left KANU in 1966 and formed the Kenya People Union (KPU), asserted, 'KANU remained an amalgam of many diverse tendencies and polices...a mere union of different and even antagonistic interests' (Journal of African Marxists 1982, 22).

On the one hand, there were leaders such as Odinga and Bildad Kaggia who believed that independence necessitated a total break with the colonial system and a fresh start. A new beginning was only possible if Kenyans themselves had total control of the country's resources and political destiny. They accused the government of betraying the pledges that it had made before independence and called for an East African Federation, which Kenyatta has so fervently defended before independence as a stepping-stone to continental unity. To them, the state was being used by nationalists in power to create a capitalist class, and various classes of property among Africans. They championed the

fight for a more egalitarian society through devices such as free public education for all, nationalization of resources, and the encouragement of co-operative farming to benefit Kenyans as a whole.

The other group consisted of the more conservative nationalists, such as Kenyatta, who stressed continuity with the past. There would be no radical departure in economic thinking, as they articulated in the KANU Manifesto that development would continue along the same lines, indicating their belief that colonial style government was difficult to overhaul. This pro-West conservative group advocated for a free-market economy with laissez-faire capital accumulation, while radicals pushed for public ownership of the means of production (Ochieng' and Ogot, 96).

How could a divided KANU meet the challenge of stimulating development to meet the needs of the people? There were the serious issues of land shortage, scarcity of capital, resources, and skilled manpower. Measures had to be taken to industrialize, improve methods of farming, and train local manpower. Kenyatta told Odinga in 1950 when Kikuyu radicals were seeking to merge with the Luos to strengthen KANU, that, 'everything will come when we have political power,' yet he preserved essentially everything from the colonial state. Institutions including the provincial administration, police, and army were taken over intact. He even maintained the services of European officers. His call to forgive and forget became the keynote of his government, and he subsequently appeased Europeans in Kenya who initially thought of Kenyatta and his government with suspicion, and thereafter accepted Kenyan citizenship and claimed, 'everything will be all right as long as the old man is there' (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 93).

Kenyatta went to great lengths to secure his Executive power. Kenya was rapidly moving away from the Participatory Democracy promised in the KANU Manifesto to a state where the President was above the workings of the law. He was both the Head of State and the Head of Government, and constitutional amendments secured that Parliament did not influence the election and rulings of the President. Within the first three years of his rule, seven substantial amendments were made to the constitution of 1963, and an eighth was being discussed. These were all aimed at strengthening the position of the Executive, and complaints lingered that they were rushed through Parliament 'before the public had time to consider the matters involved' (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 94).

It was in this context that the *Sessional Paper #10 of 1965* was formulated.

Kenya's Key Policy Documents

Although designed to pacify the radicals, the *Sessional Paper #10 of 1965; African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya* eventually accounted for their breakaway from KANU. The Paper showed no intention on the part of government to alter the economic structures inherited from the British. The Sessional Paper was written in two parts:

The first part is definitive and seeks to clarify the meaning of African Socialism. The second part examines the practical measures and steps to implement African Socialism within Kenya's Development Plan (Sessional Paper 1965, 2).

A clear definition of African Socialism in a Kenyan context was never given. Despite the fact that the document stated in article 4:

The ultimate objectives of society include: 1, political equality; 2, social justice; 3, human dignity including freedom of conscience; 4, freedom from want, disease, and exploitations; 5, equal opportunities; and 6, high growing per capita incomes, equitably distributed (Sessional Paper 1965, 1-2),

Priority was given to the maximization of growth as opposed to social justice. According to article 33:

The use of a range of controls also has as its counterpart the permission of varying degrees of private participation...enhancing the role of the individual in society. If human dignity and freedom are to be preserved, provision must be made for both activities by the individual—consumption and accumulation (Sessional Paper 1965, 11-12).

This clause urged individual wealth accumulation, not social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth that the Paper initially claimed as an ultimate objective of society.

Indeed the focus on rapid economic growth was reinforced in article 142, (11), which stated:

The bulk of Government development expenditure will be channeled into directly productive activities in order to establish a foundation for increased and extended welfare services in the future (Sessional Paper 1965, 52).

This is how the government sought to explain its failure to invest development funds in social welfare services for the Kenyans who wanted assurance that the government had them in mind when formulating policies. One needed only to read between the lines of this document to identify the fifty-six pages of contradictions and capitalist guidelines.

As appropriately observed in 1967 by an anonymous writer for *East African Journal*:

In interpreting the principles of African Socialism, the paper constantly chose whatever investment of resources would earn the greatest increment of national wealth. If well-paid foreign experts, incentives to overseas firms, loans to the most progressive farmers, investments in the most fertile provinces, and a tax structure which enabled the enterprising to enjoy the reward of their efforts would

best promote the development of the country, then the paper was single-minded in endorsing them. But would this not mean that social justice and human dignity were, after all, to be compromised for material ends in the faint hope of reinstating them more fully in some distant future?" (Sandbrook 1965, 6)

Article 7, (3) insisted that Kenya:

Must not rest for its success on a satellite relationship with any other country or groups of country (Sessional Paper 1965, 3).

From the outset, the KANU government based its policies on a clear strategy to keep existing ties with Britain. Foreign investors and Multi-national Corporations found homes in Kenya as their influence increased dramatically over the years. Between 1964-1970, large-scale foreign investment in commerce and industry almost doubled. The average annual rate of inflow capital for the period of 1967-1970 was UK£ 41.3 million (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 85).

Foreign capital was welcomed:

On the condition that to curtail their political influence in internal economic matters, foreign investors were expected to accept the spirit of mutual responsibility by making shares in their companies available to Africans who wished to buy them, by employing Africans at managerial levels as soon as qualified people could be found, and providing training facilities for Africans (Ochieng' and Ogot, 1995, 85).

Chapter four of Kenya's First Five-Year Development Plan of 1964-1970 outlined the conditions of Kenya's future economic growth. It expressed the demand for private capital formation—construction, plant, machinery, and equipment...and the determination of government to achieve a substantial rate of growth for Kenya, and stimulate the private demand. Article 10 stressed:

The need for foreign capital...to bolster the economy; projecting an inflow of foreign capital investment over the five-year period to be UK£ 140 (Development Plan 1964, 27).

Again in contradiction, Article 41, (3) of the Sessional Paper held:

The government would discourage the inflow of private capital (Sessional Paper 1965, 13).

Article 50 stated:

We shall welcome both governmental and private investment in Kenya...we shall also encourage investors to participate jointly in projects with our government (Sessional Paper 1965, 13).

This was initially articulated in the KANU Manifesto of 1960:

The KANU government, while encouraging private investment, would ensure that the undertaking would be directed according to our national policy and needs (KANU Manifesto 1963, 22).

Because of these capitalist ideals, Bildad Kaggia, formerly in the Ministry of

Education, argued:

I do not mind if you call our socialism African Socialism, Kenyan Socialism, Kikuyu Socialism, or even Luo Socialism, but I believe that whatever prefixes we use it must be socialism and not capitalism (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 96).

The more that documents and policies diverged from the tenets of African Socialism, the more the KANU government resorted to rhetorical statements within key documents and policies to pretentiously support its link to African Socialism and Pan-Africanism. Tom Mboya eloquently articulated:

Pan-Africanism was a movement based on common experience under the yoke of colonialism and fostered by our sense of common dignity and presence of traditional brotherhood. I strongly believe that in the field of economic relations we can similarly be guided by the traditional presence of socialist ideas and in the

African mental make-up...when I talk of "African Socialism" I refer to those proved codes of conduct in African societies which over the ages conferred dignity in our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life (Friedland and Rosberg 1964, 251).

Africanization of the Economy

The Sessional paper advocated for Africanization throughout the economy, while at the same time professed that there was an absolute need to rely on expatriates for the maintenance of rapid economic growth. Africanization was one of the more emotive political slogans used before independence to promise Kenyans that KANU would replace Europeans and Asians who controlled large-scale agriculture, industry, commerce and trade. The subsequent task was to transfer this power. The KANU Manifesto stated:

Kenya needs a 'Crash Program' of Africanization and such a program should consist of a deliberate aim to secure promotion and recruitment opportunities for the Africans...Localization to KANU means no more than Africanization (KANU Manifesto 1963, 2).

The government certainly was in a conundrum because most Kenyans simply were not trained as the power structure of colonialism instituted and perpetuated a racial stratification of employment with Africans at the bottom. Nearly all of the posts that required special skills were reserved for Europeans and Asians. Kenya thus entered independence as a state with very little skilled manpower among Africans, and this quandary was addressed in the *Sessional Paper* in Part 2 of the document: *Application of African Socialism to Planning in Kenya*. Article 61 stated:

Kenya had ample numbers of unskilled manpower and every effort would be made to use their services wherever possible...As with capital, we can grow rapidly now only by supplementing our meager supply of domestic, trained,

manpower with large numbers of skilled people borrowed from abroad (Sessional Paper 1965, 21).

This was not consistent with African Socialism, which would not have urged rapid economic growth at the expense of neglecting Kenyans who needed to be trained. Money would have been invested in this training as opposed to absorbed in bringing people from abroad, and for paying former European settlers. Kenyatta faced the dilemma of translating socialist ideals into a political reality, yet needed Kenya to progress economically.

Kenyatta's government opted to institute various training programs and negotiate technical assistance agreements with foreign governments, firms, and individuals, thus resulting in a dramatic increase by 1971 in the number of European personnel in advisory, operational, and volunteer positions. There were 3,700 expatriates serving under technical assistance schemes, of whom 60 percent were British. This level of dependence was unusual even in an African context. The influential decision making power and presence of these expatriates tended to undermine Kenyan self-confidence and promoted a feeling of dependency as opposed to the self-help and reliance that Africanization should have fostered (Sandbrook 1975, 8).

KANU did, however, manage to pass legislation such as the Trade Licensing Act of 1967, which excluded non-citizens from trading in rural and non rural areas and specialized a list of goods which were to be restricted to citizen traders only. There was also the transfer of capital into the hands of Africans through state credit institutions, such as the Agriculture Finance Corporation (AFC), the Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) the National Housing Corporation (NHC) and the Industrial and

Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). The state used these organizations for resource and capital mobilization and the transfer of capital to a limited number of Kenyan citizens. The government did establish, within the capitalist mode of production, small businessmen such as small retail traders, bar-owners, small transporters, builders, etc. They expanded while Asian and European competition was progressively excluded and credit was channeled to them on favorable terms (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 87), indicating that the KANU government did, in fact, make strides to promote Africanization. These acts were minimal and, by no means, representative of KANU's development strategy. They merely indicated attempts to ameliorate an insignificant portion of the Kenyan population within a capitalist framework.

The Sessional Paper also advanced policies to assist the African businessmen at the expense of average Kenyans who occupied the bottom of the racially stratified hierarchy. Aspirant businessmen were provided with various training schemes and with technical advice and assistance once commercial or industrial activities were undertaken. More special assistance was provided to them such as the reservation of certain categories of government contract (Sandbrook 1975, 9). This was an attempt of Kenya's ruling elite class to encourage a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie by providing an incentive to become businessmen. So, only European expatriates, non-Kenyans and Kenyan businessmen could easily reap the benefits of Kenya's independence.

Issues of Land

Land was the touchstone of KANU's policies, and Kenyans demanded the return of stolen land as a matter of social justice. They detested the notion of paying

compensation to the settlers, and KANU leaders like Kaggia sought to address their grievances. Moderates and conservatives within KANU felt otherwise, and articulated within the KANU Manifesto the principle of fair and just compensation despite the fact that this went directly against the needs and interests of the people. 'Free things' in an African-run Kenya were not allowed (Journal of African Marxists 1982, 19).

As a primarily agricultural economy, agriculture at independence was crucial to facilitate economic and industrial growth. Agricultural problems were acute since historically Africans were excluded from the cash crop agricultural sector. Moreover, colonialism introduced the policies of the East African Royal Commission of 1953-1955, and the system of African communal land ownership was sacrificed for individual title deeds. The Swynerton Plan of 1954 further affirmed that reform of African land tenure was a prerequisite of agricultural development, and the Land Registration Ordinance of 1959 and the Registered Land Act of 1963 were enacted to achieve individualization of tenure among African people (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 87).

Since KANU proclaimed to build on the tradition of constructing African Socialism, the logical consequence would have been what Nyerere upheld in *Uhuru na Ujamaa* as a co-operative approach to African participation in commercial agriculture since traditionally in African societies, land was not individually owned in order to prevent exploitation. Instead, individuals only possessed rights to use the land that belonged to the clan or lineage. The *Sessional Paper*, however, rejected this element of African Socialism on the grounds of the efficacy of African tradition in this respect because this mode was outdated in the face of modernization. Alternatively, individual

ownership and enterprise were promoted, leaving the co-operative element for the marketing of produce. The paper stated in article 30:

African traditions cannot be handed over indiscriminately to a modern, monetary economy. The need to develop and invest requires credit and a credit economy rests heavily on a system of land titles and their registration (Sessional Paper 1965, 10-11).

Kenyatta felt that property rights should be respected, and held, "we do not believe in giving this or that for free" (Journal of African Marxists 1982, 24).

The Million-Acre Settlement Scheme was announced by the colonial government in July of 1962 and issued part of the White Highlands to be subdivided and sold to 30,000 landless families. In immediate terms, this meant that some landless families would be fortunate, but independent Kenya would have to repay British and World Bank loans, meaning that with independence Kenya was already in debt. This Scheme was a strategy to de-politicize a potentially explosive situation and resulted in some land being sold to the landless in order to buy security for the large number of Highland farms, that remained in settler hands or passed to a small number of African elites. This existing colonial agricultural framework of large mixed farms and numerous smallholdings transferred intact to Independent Kenya. White Highlands became the "Multi-Racial" highlands and African mixed farmers now shared the settler economic outlook. Small holders were drowning in debt and trapped in a cycle of poverty. KANU Conservative authorities, however, viewed this new formula as a political triumph because they were doing *something* to help the landless. Kenyatta had the tacit control of moderates and conservatives and had no qualms about moving against the *Kiama kia Muingi* (KKM), the regrouping of the former Kenya Land Freedom Army who fought in Mau Mau and

were now committed to free land through active seizures if necessary, and against all groups who refused to accept the compromising land policy. Ex-detainees soon found themselves re-detained and squatters who lost their land to White settlers and boldly sought to regain it were imprisoned (Journal of African Marxists 1982, 25).

Quite simply, the independent government did not emphasize transformation of the pre-existing economy, only minimal Africanization of it. By 1970, however, more than two-thirds of the old European farms were given to 50,000 African families. The remaining third, nearly 1 million acres, was still in European hands and would be purchased over the next decade. Gavin Kitching in his book *Class and Economic Change in Kenya* pointed out that in the period of 1958-1968, the gross farm revenue of African smallholders in Kenya grew from a little under 8 million to over 34 million, a remarkable increase of over 420 per cent in a decade. Nonetheless, 4 million acres of ranch land and plantations of coffee, tea, and sisal remained in foreign hands because of their capital value (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 87).

Conclusion

The future provided Kenyans with more unfulfilled promises, and fewer attempts to see the ideals of Pan-Africanism actualized. If Kenya could not even achieve national unity and faced internal social problems such as tribalism, unequal investments in different provinces, and grave ideological differences within the ruling party, how then could it in any way help pave the path for African Unity?

Key principles of human dignity and freedom from exploitation articulated in documents like the *Sessional Paper #10* were countered by capitalist principles within the same documents—accounting for contradictory policy statements full of dubious concepts and ambiguities. One cannot speak of private investments, businessmen, expatriate work opportunities, or dependence on foreign aid in an African Socialist framework. Mboya later disagreed with critics who called for scientific socialism and claimed:

To impose on a people a rigid system (Marxian) that takes no account of their needs, desires, aspirations, and customs was to court disaster and failure (Mboya 1970, 97).

Kenyatta also argued:

It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by simply crying communism (Ochieng' and Ogot 1995, 97).

The term 'African' was used so effectively throughout documents like the *Sessional paper*, *The KANU Manifesto*, and *The Development paper* to lure and disorient readers so that they felt that by virtue of its usage, everything advanced had to be traditionally African. It was used as an umbrella term implying that there was only one way of facilitating 'African-ness,' and Kenya was doing it. This camouflaged the lack of ideological clarity throughout documents and policies and accounted for the weak platform for KANU, and its failure to work toward the attainment of Pan-African unity or national unity. Documents relied on the prospective mobilization of those who were blinded by the 'African' emotive rhetoric.

If a young nation like Kenya had succeeded in transforming its colonial institutions and economy into a socialist state, then the impact this transformation would have had on other states would have been phenomenal. A former settler colony that was able to dynamically reconstruct what was so entrenched in an imperialist system definitely would have proved that African Socialism, and by extension Pan-Africanism, was attainable.

Even when it came to total regional unity, Kenyatta feared that the empowerment of Nyerere—a staunch socialist who wanted to give Kenyatta a leading position in the prospective East African Federation—would give too much power and respect. In no context can one argue that Kenyatta worked to build an Independent Africa free from foreign domination and influence. He gave foreigners red carpet treatment and they continued to control all economic matters in his country at the expense of Kenyans. With the backing of the West, he was the creator of an imperialist presidency and secured his Executive power through constitutional amendments that relieved Parliament from any say over the conduct of his use of power (Journal of African Marxists 1982, 24). The emphasis throughout his regime was on economic growth, lacking an incentive for the people and their human dignity. African Socialism and Pan-African ideals in the case of Kenya certainly were dreams deferred.

Conclusion

Final Thoughts and Future Prospects

The relative weakness of the OAU, the failure of Kenya and Tanzania to successfully implement African Socialism in the face of economic adversity, and the diametrically opposing ideologies among Pan-African leaders in the Diaspora and continent alike indicate that Pan-Africanism, as John Iliffe says of African Socialism, was a mythical creature that people hunted fruitlessly. Can such grave ideological differences among leaders, and such unpromising economic and social conditions be overcome, or at least minimized, in the twenty-first century? As this analysis conveys, Pan-Africanism never developed as a coherent ideology relative to the African and Diasporan experience, but rather was reactive to African and Western interaction first in the Diaspora, and then on the continent.

Currently, President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya appears to be picking up where Kwame Nkrumah left off. For cynics who feel that he is wasting his time because history has proven that African integration simply is not feasible and cannot work, then the formation of the African Union, (AU) as of July 2001, means nothing. More optimistic people feel encouraged because the OAU charter has been rewritten and promises more action among African states in the internal affairs of others, and the organization is following the paths of global economies. The mission of the AU is to drive Africa into the future with strength. Gaddafi is the author of the script, and admits that he borrowed heavily from the structural blueprints of the European Union. His ambitious plans for a Pan-African parliament, court of justice, central bank and common currency were

initially sidelined by some leaders who feared that proposals for a political and monetary union were unrealistic and could be destabilizing. When Nigeria and South Africa, Africa's largest economies, fell into line, Gadaffi won the two-thirds majority necessary for creating the AU (Nevin 2001, 11).

UN Secretary General Koffi Annan was present at the 37th OAU Summit and said in an address he delivered:

This historic effort will require leadership, courage and willingness to depart from the ways of the past, if it is to do for Africa what the European Union has done for Europe...The resolution of the many conflicts in Africa is essential to making the continent work...In a great measure the result of misguided leadership which is unwilling or unable to put the people's interests first...No one can say that my country has peace and therefore conflicts in this or that country are not my responsibility. No one wants to invest in bad neighborhoods, so we need to clean up our neighborhood (Quist-Arcton 2001,1).

Mathatha Tsedu, chairman of the SA National Editors Forum, thinks that the AU is walking down a well-trodden path. In Tsedu's view, the catalogue of Africa's current woes is no less intimidating than the list of colonies that confronted Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere nearly four decades ago. However, the questions that have to be answered in a modern context are how relevant was the OAU to today's challenges, and what is the way forward for economic emancipation? He claims that the organization can no longer focus on fighting non-existent colonial battles, and instead the AU has to fight the new battles of the globalized world. This means uniting the economic blocs that constitute the continent, ensuring that resources are pooled, and creating larger markets for African produce. It also means creating a social and political environment conducive to democracy, and allowing people to lead their lives in peace. This is the hope embodied in the AU charter. (Nevin 2001, 11).

Dr Anthony Holiday of the University of the Western Cape's School of

Government and at the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris, says the organization's decision to fashion itself after the European Union is:

Obedient mimicry, in which the African continent takes another step away from its authentic cultures, religious, artistic and political tradition. What else does the new dispensation signal except an African acknowledgement—justified or not—of the superiority of our erstwhile colonial masters way of doing things? What does it amount to, if not an admission that the European ethos represents our only hope of escape from the cycles of economic failure and fratricidal strife that have become synonymous, for many observers, with the very name of Africa? We cannot go on using a doublespeak without generating a new politics of resistance on the part of a generation of young Africans of all colors and creeds, who demand to be told the unambiguous truth about where their leaders are taking them (Nevin 2001, 12).

Indeed, the decision to model the AU Charter on that of the EU brings us full circle to Pan-African origins and its emergence as a movement that responded to African and White interaction in the Diaspora and then Africa. This move appears to be a declaration that the European ethos represents the only hope in Africa of escape from the cycles of economic failure and political strife.

The real challenge facing the AU is to get 55 nations all reading from the same page to facilitate the economic advancement that Gadaffi and AU leaders are seeking to promote. While doubt has been cast over the success of the AU, there is some hope and determination to build on the vision. At the outset, South Africa along with its two strategic partners, Nigeria and Algeria, were identified by the West and international financial institutions as having the capacity to lead Africa's recovery. This initially took the shape of President Thabo Mbeki's Millennium African Recovery Plan (MAP). Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade had also been working on a rival African economic blueprint, called the Omega Plan (Nevin 2001, 11).

Thus modern economic advancement assumes precedence over Nyerere's drive to unveil human attributes that seek more than money. Africa is now an integral part of the global economic system, although more through exploitation than equal standing with other states, and people are driven more by a need to survive in this capitalist system than to return to an extraordinary past. Moreover, states are limited in what they can provide for their populaces because of restraints put forth by organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that have issued Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Public spending is reduced considerably, so trying to have the state control the means of production and promote a socialist system is nothing short of impossible. Initially, Pan-Africanism was thought to be attainable through African Socialism, but in a modern context it may be realizable only in a capitalist framework since nearly all African states have such systems. Nyerere truly believed that Tanzania could escape the yoke of imperialism and create a state that was not interwoven into the world capitalist system. Such a task was impossible to achieve given the extent to which capitalism had infiltrated the world. That he could not escape the system he feared accounts for the doom of his socialist efforts. While he tirelessly attempted to instill an egalitarian and communal ethic in Tanzania, government officials could not overcome their avarice, and Tanzanians became increasingly poorer. Kenya, and most African states, from the onset did not seek to replace the existing capitalist systems that they inherited, and rather embraced them in order to promote economic advancement. Nyerere once said of Kenya that it was a 'man eat man country,' to which Jomo Kenyatta claimed that Tanzania was a 'man eat dog country.' Indeed, their post-independence economies reflected, and continue to reflect these unfortunate trends. Had the policies they pursued been different,

perhaps the outcomes would have been considerably different—but again this is purely speculative. The unfortunate historical record of Pan-Africanism ideally should not impede the progress or prospects of its current resurgence, and this is the hope of modern Pan-Africanists like Mandela and Gadaffi who are instrumental in the movement. African Socialism, as Nyerere envisioned, may not be on their agendas, but nonetheless they are championing a movement of Africans, by Africans, and for African unity in the twenty-first century.

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